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QUARTERLY ANALYSIS:
The Progress of Monetary, Banking and Payment System
Quarter 2, 2009
Quarterly Report Team, Bank Indonesia

Developments in the global economy suggest a gathering momentum in the recovery
process, although still daunted by risks. In developed nations, various indicators of
macroeconomic recovery have shown an improving trend. Government-sponsored stimulus
packages and financial sector stabilisation programmes have successfully bolstered public
confidence, and in turn strengthened consumption. Conditions on credit markets have also
begun to improve in an added development encouraging greater private consumption. Despite
this, stubbornly high levels of unemployment pose risks daunting the economic recovery process
in these nations. On the other hand, economic recovery is gaining momentum in emerging
market countries, led by China, India and Korea. Investment activity in China, under way since
the beginning of the year, is supported by a fiscal stimulus through infrastructure spending and
brisk credit expansion Resurgent domestic demand in these Asian economies has stimulated
improved economic performance in other countries in the region. Despite this, the economic
improvement in some emerging market countries is not yet regarded sufficient to compensate
for the slowdown in advanced economies. In response to these developments, further contraction
is predicted in the global economy, although at a lesser pace.
Expectations of world economic recovery have fuelled positive developments on global
financial markets. Global financial sector performance showed steady gains throughout Q2/
2009. Stock markets in developed economies recorded index gains on the back of positive
sentiment linked to improvement in bank performance in the wake of the stress tests, optimism
for stabilisation of the financial sector and economic conditions and positive performance
reported in financial statements published by some world financial institutions. Banking sector
conditions have shown improvement, as reflected in a relaxation of lending standards. These
financial market developments in advanced nations have in turn impacted financial markets in
the region. Despite this, financial market developments took a downturn near the end of the
period, triggered by negative sentiment related to stubbornly high levels of unemployment in
the United States and Europe.
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The improving trend in the global economy has had a positive impact on Indonesia»s
economic performance. The impact of strengthening demand in trading partners, led by China
and India, has boosted Indonesian exports of commodities such as CPO, coal and copper,.
Despite the steady improvement, the lack of recovery in the global economy means that exports
continue to suffer contraction. Concerning domestic demand, the flagging pace of private
consumption has been mitigated by the presidential election and the payout of the 13th month
salary to civil servants. Investment activity remains limited under the present conditions of
continued weak demand and low levels of capacity utilisation. In view of these developments,
economic growth in Q2/2009 is estimated at 3.7%-4.0%.
In regard to prices, the declining inflation trend is set to continue. During June 2009,
consumer goods prices recorded 0.11% inflation (mtm), considerably below the historical level
and earlier projections. Increases in some international food commodity prices were again offset
by appreciation in the rupiah, thus keeping a lid on increases in domestic prices. Besides the
appreciation in the rupiah, improving expectations of inflation bolstered by the accelerated
pace of disinflation brought down the rate of core inflation. Measures to safeguard adequate
supplies of food staples also helped maintain low inflation in Q2/2009. Taken together, cumulative
inflation in the CPI measured 0.21% (ytd) or 3.65% (yoy).
Rising commodity prices and strengthening demand in emerging market countries also
bolstered the balance of payments, which is performing ahead of earlier predictions. Balance
of payments performance has strengthened on the back of a larger than expected surplus in
the current account. Non-oil and gas exports have received a boost from rising global market
commodity prices, led by mining commodities and crude palm oil, and also from resurgent
demand in emerging market nations and especially China and India. In the capital and financial
account, portfolio investments again recorded a surplus. Improving conditions on global financial
markets and sustained positive perceptions of the domestic economy have prompted renewed
growth in portfolio capital inflows. However, following the capital reversal that hit domestic
financial markets in mid-June 2009, portfolio investment levels for Q2/2009 were not as high
as predicted. Inflows for direct investment are also estimated to have climbed in response to
growing exploration activity by oil and natural gas companies. Furthermore, the confidence
that has been maintained in the domestic economic outlook and the freeing up of global
financial markets has led to higher than forecasted disbursements on private foreign debt. As
a result, international reserves reached US$57.58 billion at end-June/2009, equivalent to 5.6
months of imports and servicing of official debt.
Improvement in the balance of payments and positive sentiment on the global market
have brought about exchange rate appreciation. Compared to other countries in the region,
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol12/iss1/2
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the rupiah maintained the second highest rate of appreciation after the Korean won. Averaged
over Q2/2009, the rupiah gained 9.99% on the back of increased supply of foreign currency in
response to foreign capital inflows. Optimism for global economic recovery alongside carefully
managed domestic economic fundamentals, reflected in the balance of payments surplus and
attractive yields on rupiah instruments, has stimulated risk appetite for financial assets in emerging
markets, including Indonesia. Despite this, negative sentiment over global economic
developments prompted a slight drop in the value of the rupiah at end-Q2/2009 compared to
early June 2009.
In the financial sector, global developments and conducive domestic macroeconomic
indicators have had a positive effect on the domestic financial sector. The stock market charted
overall index gains during Q2/2009 despite temporary capital reversal near the end of the
quarter that prompted a dip in the stock index. Improvement in domestic fundamentals and
rising global commodity prices have paved the way for brisk share buying activity by foreign
and domestic investors. On the bond market, yield on Indonesian government securities eased
in line with the downward movement in the monetary policy rate and resurgent interest among
foreign investors. Despite this, Government Securities yield in longer tenors (above 15 years)
remains high, reflecting strong risk perceptions.
In the banking sector, the national banking system is in comparatively stable condition
despite the limited banking response to monetary easing. At the micro level, conditions in the
Indonesian banking system were again stable, as indicated by the safe level of the capital
adequacy ratio (CAR) at a high 17.3% in May 2009. Alongside this, the gross non-performing
loans (NPLs) ratio has been held below 5% with net NPLs less than 2%. Banking liquidity,
including liquidity on the interbank money market, is steadily improving alongside growth in
depositor funds. Despite this, bank interest rates again showed only limited response. The base
lending rate response to the 250 bps reduction in the BI Rate from December 2008 to June
2009 measured no more than about 45 bps in figures for May 2009. In a related development,
bank loan disbursements for the position at May 2009 saw further contraction at 1.1% (ytd).
Even so, liquidity in the economy was adequate. Although the expansion in monetary aggregates
(cash outside banks and M1) remains very thin, calculations based on fundamentals indicate
that the trend in monetary aggregates is still commensurate to the needs of the economy. With
loan interest rates declining at a slower pace and the very limited rate of credit expansion,
indications are emerging of a more intensive shift under way in business towards non-bank
financing alternatives, such as bond issues.
Looking forward, the economic growth outlook is better than originally predicted. In the
short-term, economic projections will be strongly influenced by global developments. The
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predicted contraction in exports for the year as a whole is expected to be offset by a surge in
private consumption from the national elections. Given the bigger than expected impact from
the election of parliamentary and local assembly candidates in Q1/2009, the 2009 presidential
polls are predicted to contribute significantly to private consumption. While purchasing power
has yet to show significant improvement, private consumption is forecasted to maintain brisk
growth in 2009 from the knock-on effects of the national elections. Against this background,
the economy has potential to chart higher than projected growth for 2009 as a whole. Indonesia»s
GDP is forecasted at 3.5%-4.0% growth by end-2009, with a bias towards the upper limit of
this band.
Indonesia»s balance of payments is predicted to chart a surplus for 2009 overall,
strengthened by improvement in global economic conditions, rising commodity prices and
ongoing stabilisation of global financial markets. Exports are predicted to improve in response
to the more evenly distributed improvement in the global economy across the world»s regions
since Q3/2008 and the ongoing rise in world commodity prices. In the capital and financial
account, foreign capital inflows in portfolio and direct investments are set to continue in line
with optimism for world economic recovery alongside more conducive conditions on global
financial markets. In addition, capital inflows in the public sector are expected to shore up
performance in the capital and financial account.
After factoring in these developments, the Bank Indonesia Board of Governors Meeting
on 03 July 2009 decided to lower the BI Rate by 25 bps from 7.0% to 6.75%. This decision is
expected to bolster measures for sustaining optimism in domestic economic growth.
Looking ahead, monetary policy will seek to maintain a balance between bolstering the
domestic economy amid the persistent sluggishness of the global economy and maintaining
macroeconomic stability over the medium-term with the looming increase in inflationary pressure
in 2010. Accordingly, future monetary policy will pursue a more prudent course in view of the
progressively limited room for monetary relaxation.
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FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD √ POST THE US
≈ASSET PRICE BUBBLE DEBACLE∆ √ A NEW WAY FORWARD

Ms. Sagarika Chakraborty
Mr. Soumya Banerjee1

Abstract
This paper analyze how we should respond to possible asset price bubbles, especially in view of the
various conceptual frameworks proposed based on a core set of scientific principles for monetary policy.
Further, efforts have also been made at my end to establish as to how Monetary policy should not react
to asset price bubbles per se, but rather to changes in the outlook for inflation and aggregate demand
resulting from asset price movements. However, regulatory policies and supervisory practices should respond
to possible asset price bubbles and help prevent feedback loops between asset price bubbles and credit
provision, thereby minimizing the damaging effects of bubbles on the economy.
The general massage of this paper is that credit conditions influence economies enormously and
emergency steps to restructure balance sheets through policy revamping are crucial for fixing problems of
excessive leverage. This stands in sharp contrast to the view from conventional models - that «the effects
of a worsening of financial intermediation are likely to be limited» and can be handled by interest rate cuts
alone.
In the alternative regulatory policy approach, we have strived to examine three possible regulatory
responses to managing bubbles: portfolio restrictions; adjustments in capital requirements; and adjustments
in provisioning requirements.

JEL Classification: E58, E63, G15

Keywords: financial crisis, asset price bubble.

1 Authors: Ms. Sagarika Chakraborty, Legal Manager, Corporate Legal Group, ICICI Bank Limited, Kolkata, India and Mr. Soumya
Banerjee, Legal Manager, Corporate Legal Group, ICICI Bank Limited, Kolkata, India.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Economic development has been a subject of great debate especially with reference to
asset price bubbles. With the hindsight of documented experience, the bursting of asset bubbles
in the housing market has often been associated with severe economic crises, especially, in the
aftermath of the recessions caused by sharp diminution in spending propensity as a result of
loss in the consumers» power to leverage against capital gains.
Much before the present financial fiasco engulfed the world the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) research reported in the World Economic Outlook in 2003 indicated that output
losses after house-price crashes in developed countries have, on average, been twice as large
as those after stock market crashes, usually resulting in lasting recessions.2
In view of the above scenario, this article mainly seeks to analyze how the existing loopholes
in the laws of various countries poise a greater threat in the coming years for a severe economic
downturn and as to how such a Diaspora would affect developing countries and their economic
stability on the world map. According to Mr. R. Kannan of the Reserve Bank of India, stock
prices seem to be a leading indicator of inflation, though they seem to lack predictive power
when it comes to the output gap, and therefore, taking example from such case studies it is
important to analyze the ≈bubble trends∆ of individual economies to chalk out proper bail out
plans and to effectuate a stable economy to evade the future set backs.
To achieve this end, we would suggest anti-bubble laws in various developing economies,
similar to ours, India which when analyzed fits the template and maps onto microeconomic
and macroeconomic research on bubble formation and essentially proposes a regulatory frame
work in comparison to the traditional ≈monetary policy∆ for all approaches.
The article also ascertains the why asset price bubbles can arise from market failures that
lead to credit booms and regulation which can help prevent feedback loops between asset
price bubbles and credit provision with the aid of regulatory policies that are to govern the
Banks.

II. HISTORICAL MONOLOGUE
The long bull market and the exuberance associated with the new economy boom of the
1990s came to a halt in 2000. Since then, broad equity price indices in industrial countries have
fallen sharply and persistently and thus, in order to appreciate the very nature of working of
2 International Monetary Fund»s report in World Economic Outlook, titled, ≈Growth and Institutions∆, published in April 2003, available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/01/index.htm
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these bubbles it is important to analyze them in light of their historical backdrop and the
underlying reason that gives rise to such debacles.
The very concept of asset price bubble being a new and emerging predicament across
economies is a misnomer. Price bubbles have existed since the mid 17th century and although
the sectors which have been affected differed but the underlying causes have more-a-less
remained the same. Clubbed together within the term of ≈economic bubble∆, (which can be
said to include speculative bubble
bubble, a market bubble
bubble, a price bubble
bubble, a financial bubble
bubble, or a
speculative mania
mania) it refers to in simple terms ≈trade in high volumes at prices that are
considerably at variance with intrinsic values.3
A brief outline of the history of asset price bubble can be summarized in the following
table:

Year

Commonly
referred to as

Brief description

1637

TULIP MANIA or
TULIPOMANIA

It was essentially the first recorded speculative bubble the Dutch Golden
Age during which contract prices for bulbs of the recently introduced tulip
reached extraordinarily high levels and then suddenly collapsed At the
peak of tulip mania in February 1637, tulip contracts sold for more than
10 times the annual income of a skilled craftsman.4

1720

SOUTH SEA BUBBLE

The South Sea Company was a British joint stock company that traded in
South America during the 18th century. Speculation in the company's
stock led to a great economic bubble known as the South Sea Bubble in
1720, which caused financial ruin for many.5

1840s

RAILWAY MANIA

One of the most discussed speculative bubbles of Britain that followed a
common pattern: as the price of railway shares increased, more and more
money was poured in by speculators, until the inevitable collapse. It reached
its zenith in 1846, when no fewer than 272 Acts of Parliament were
passed, setting up new railway companies, and the proposed routes totalled
9,500 miles (15,300 km) of new railway. Around a third of the railways
authorised were never built for reasons of the company either collapsing
due to poor financial planning, or for being bought out by a larger
competitor before it could build its line, or because it turned out to be a
fraudulent enterprise to channel investors' money into another business.6

3 King, Ronald R.; Smith, Vernon L.; Williams, Arlington W. and van Boening, Mark V. (1993). ≈The Robustness of Bubbles and Crashes
in Experimental Stock Markets∆. in R. H. Day and P. Chen. Nonlinear Dynamics and Evolutionary Economics. New York: Oxford
University Press. ISBN 0195078594.Ω Also see, Lahart, Justin (2008-05-16). ≈Bernanke»s Bubble Laboratory, Princeton Protégés of Fed
Chief Study the Economics of Manias∆. The Wall Street Journal : p.ΩA1. avaialbe at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB121089412378097011.html.
4 Tulipomania: The Story of the World»s Most Coveted Flower & the Extraordinary Passions It Aroused.∆ Mike Dash (2001).
5 John O»Farrell, An Utterly Impartial History of Britain - Or 2000 Years of Upper Class Idiots In Charge (October 22 2007) (2007,
Doubleday, ISBN 9780385611985). Also, see Charles Mackay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (Harriman
House Classics 2003), p. 65 & 71.
6 Wolmar, C, 2007, Fire & Steam: A History of the Railways in Britain, Atlantic Book (London) ISBN 978-1-84354-629-0.
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Year

Commonly
referred to as

Brief description

1920s

FLORIDA LAND
BOOM

The Florida land boom of the 1920s was first reported real estate bubble,
which burst in 1925, leaving behind entire new cities and the remains of
failed development projects. What started with a frenzy report proclaiming
≈It's June In Miami∆, resulted in property prices rising rapidly on
speculation and a land and development boom was ensued.7

1970s

POISEDON Bubble

It was the first so called stock market bubble in which the price of
Australian mining shares soared in late 1969, only to crash in the early
1970s. It was triggered by the Poseidon NL company's discovery of a
promising site for nickel mining in September 1969.8

1980s

JAPANESE ASSET
PRICE Bubble

In the decades following World War II, Japan implemented stringent tariffs
and policies to encourage people to save their income. With more money
in banks, loans and credit became easier to obtain, and with Japan
running large trade surpluses, the yen appreciated against foreign
currencies. This allowed local companies to invest in capital resources
much more easily than their competitors overseas, which reduced the price
of Japanese-made goods and widened the trade surplus further.9 And,
with the yen appreciating, financial assets became very lucrative, giving
rise to an economic bubble in Japan from 1986 to 1990, in which real
estate and stock prices greatly inflated.10 The bubble's collapse lasted for
more than a decade with stock prices bottoming in 2003, until hitting an
even lower low amidst the current global crisis in 2008.

1997

ASIAN FINANCIAL
CRISIS

Periods of financial crisis followed post 1997 that not only gripped Asia
but also raised fears of a worldwide economic meltdown due to financial
contagion. The crisis started in Thailand with the financial collapse of the
Thai baht caused by the decision of the Thai government to float the baht,
cutting its peg to the USD, after exhaustive efforts to support it in the face
of a severe financial overextension that was in part real estate driven. At
the time, Thailand had acquired a burden of foreign debt that made the
country effectively bankrupt even before the collapse of its currency. As
the crisis spread, most of Southeast Asia and Japan saw slumping
currencies, devalued stock markets and other asset prices, and a
precipitous rise in private debt.11

Kenneth Ballinger: Miami Millions, Miami: (self published), 1936. p. 139.
Three Australian Asset-price Bubbles∆, The Reserve Bank of Australia, 2003. Available at http://www.rba.gov.au/
PublicationsAndResearch/2003/Simon.pdf.
9 Bank of Japan, ≈Asset Price Bubble in Japan in the 1980s: Lessons for Financial and Macroeconomic Stability∆ http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/
english/publication/edps/2003/03-E-15.pdf.
10 ≈Japan»s Bubble Economy∆.http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/bubble.htm.
11 Kaufman, GG., Krueger, TH., Hunter, WC. (1999). The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications and Solutions. Springer. ISBN
0792384725.
7
8
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Year
2006 to
till date

Commonly
referred to as
REAL ESTATE BUBBLE

9

Brief description
Since 2006, the existence of real estate bubbles or the sub-prime
mortgage crisis across the world, has led economists to wonder about the
similar patterns in real estate markets of a wide variety of countries, which
essentially include similar patterns of overvaluation and excessive
borrowing based on those overvaluations. These Real estate bubbles are
invariably followed by severe price decreases (also known as a house price
crash) that can result in many owners holding negative equity and in the
present context that is exactly what has happened leading countries like
India, United States, United Kingdom, Japan, China to witness rapid
increases in valuations of real property such as housing until they reach
unsustainable levels relative to incomes and other economic elements.

A deeper examination and insight into the above models of asset price bubbles would
indicate that the output losses after house-price crashed in developed countries have, on an
average, been twice as large as those after the stock market crashes, usually resulting in a
enduring recessions.12 Further, the prickly surge in value of the housing stock supported by an
equally strong upturn in prices has led analysts to wonder if this boom is really sustainable or is
merely a large financial bubble ready to burst. The recent surge in housing prices globally has
gone hand-in-hand with a much larger jump in household debt than in previous booms.13 It is
understood that not only that new buyers engaged bigger mortgages, but even existing owners
have increased their size of mortgages to turn capital gains into cash resulting in a rally in
housing prices.
Seeing the recent trends, the strong upsurge in the housing market in the US is a source
of concern, especially, the global financial stability. And while all round development of the
housing sector is a welcome boon, it is also important to take note of the pace of such cyclical
intensification in lieu of the magnanimous risks of budding asset price bubbles. Of the several
factors that contribute to the occurrence of bubbles are high credit growth coupled with low
interest rates. The historical cases of asset price debacles are therefore, useful to have some
empirical analysis devoted to the assessment of the current conditions in the housing market
from the point of view of developing economies, their policy choices in regard to the housing
market.

12 International Monetary Fund»s report in World Economic Outlook, titled, ≈Growth and Institutions∆, published in April 2003, available
at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/01/index.htm
13 Identifying Asset Price Bubbles in the Housing Market in India - Preliminary Evidence, Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers, Vol.
27, No. 1 and 2, Summer and Monsoon 2006.
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With reference to developing countries like India, it is to be understood that in such
countries empirical research on housing market is scarce due to the paucity of information.
With the objective of filling this void, the following few chapters of this article attempts to
theoretically analyze the housing price bubbles in India √ particularly aiming at separating the
real from speculative price elements and focusing on the relevant monetary aggregates that
have a bearing on the growth of the housing market.

III. THE CONCERNS BEHIND THE ≈ASSET PRICE BUBBLE DEBACLE∆
There are numerous factors, which emerge to be important towards the growth of the
housing market primarily comprising of income growth, monetary policy, tax and regulatory
incentives and procedural ease of loan disbursals, etc. The speculative factors, on the other
hand, may depend on the propaganda built around advertising, asymmetric information and
speculative or herd behavior-causing prices to rise to unsustainable levels beyond which it is
determined by the above-mentioned factors. Although it is difficult to categorize a housing
price bubble, which occurs due to a deviation of market price from the fundamental value of
the house, a number of eclectic approaches for identification have been an effective tool.
One of the other concerns arises out of the model proposed by Ball (1999), wherein he
suggested the existence of an asset price bubble is not evident till a particular cycle has elapsed.
For the purpose of his matrix, Ball had presumed a time frame of 2 years for the existence of the
prince bubble could be ascertained with confidence. He went on to analyze that any curbing of
monetary policy before this entire cycle was over, would definitely curb the growth of the bubble
initially but leading investors to believe that the crisis was over. However, Ball suggested that this
rose tinted picture was merely an illusion, as the moment monetary policy was regularized; the
economy would slump down again and thereby igniting the vicious cycle all over again. It is
evident that Ball like Posen was also belonged to the school of thought who suggested that the
old idea of ≈monetary policy∆ being the out an out savior needed a revamp and newer approaches
were to be suggested, if asset price bubbles were to be deal in a complete way.
Out of the various approaches preferred, index of housing prices and interest rates provided
by the Banks of the home country are taken to be useful indices for studying such occurrences
of bubbles. It may, however, be pointed out that among all other sectors the movement in the
interest rates on housing loans whether fixed or floating have been by and large synchronous
with the short term money market rate in the recent years, as evidenced by the reduction of
interest rate on housing loans.14
14 Identifying Asset Price Bubbles in the Housing Market in India - Preliminary Evidence, Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers, Vol.
27, No. 1 and 2, Summer and Monsoon 2006.
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a. Areas of Concern
With regard to the looming concerns on GDP, interest rates and its co-relation with asset
price bubbles, few observations have been noted after a deeper insight into the previous bubble
debacle cases, which point out arenas that are required to be understood and deliberated
upon, before chalking the future economic pathway:15
(1) Policy interest rate shock is the only shock that can itself have a long run effect on the
interest rate.
(2) In the long run credit conditions will be determined by supply conditions, i.e. aggregate
credit supply and interest rate.
(3) GDP growth is affected by permanent shocks attributed to itself, interest rate and credit
growth, presuming in the monetarist tradition, that easy credit availability at a low interest
rate environment plays a crucial role in stimulating economic activity.
(4) Finally, housing prices are affected in the long run by permanent shocks in interest rate,
credit and GDP shocks and own innovations in housing prices.
b. Monetary Policy
The above discovery has in turn led us to another great concern of housing price bubbles Monetary policy and the role of central banks» in effective curbing of the same. The IMF»s Report
in 200316 suggested that that housing price bursts during the late 1970s and early 1980s was
actually followed by tightening of monetary policies to reduce inflation. However, the reliance on
monetary policy has also met with substantial criticism over the past few years, and it has been
noted that other factors are equally responsible in the interplay of asset price bubble and mere
tightening of the monetary policy may not always be the viable solution. This view has also been
supported by OECD,17 when it held that, while monetary authorities can have many choices to
respond to asset price developments including housing prices, the policy response to housing
prices should be related only to the extent that they contain information about future output
growth and inflation, and that, if desired, would be more appropriate to use an alternative policy
instruments.

15 An In-Depth Analysis of the East Asian Crisis: Special Implications for India, Subhajit Sr., Indira Gandhi Institute of Development
Research (IGIDR), 2008, accessible at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1152131.
16 International Monetary Fund»s report in World Economic Outlook, titled, ≈Growth and Institutions∆, published in April 2003, available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/01/index.htm.
17 Asset Price Booms and Monetary Policy∆, Carsten Detken and Frank Smets, European Central Bank (ECB), 2004, accessible at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=533122.
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c. Excessive Risk Taking Trends
While the role of monetary policy has been in great deliberation some observers see the
meltdown threatening Western financial markets as the cost paid due to warped enticements
in the financial system, which has encouraged excessive risk-propensity. It is thought that the
growing concern arise out of Banks and financial institutions succeeding in compelling their
creditors against high returns due to lower tail risks and pay out of excess returns as bonuses,
and thereby edging towards omnibus financial crisis. While this is a one dimensional view
taken on a micro spectrum, others trace the problem to industry-wide externalities, and claim
that if bank»s equity rises with asset prices, the size of the balance sheet consistent with the
value at risk also rises, and financial intermediary demand will act pro-cyclically, with periods.18

d. Low Interest Rates and Sub Prime Loans
Like other countries across the world, India, before the present economic debacle witnessed
an era of low interest rates and steady economic growth, which although fancied the consumers,
assured stable future for investors, encouraged rapid expansion in the balance sheets of highly
leveraged institutions (HLIs) but also gave rise to the concern of ≈shadow banking system∆. It
has been noted that in countries like US, where such a phenomena was strongly witnessed, the
«shadow banking system» expanded so swiftly that by 2006 ≈the combined balance sheets of
investment banks and hedge funds was over 50% of commercial banks» balance sheets∆.19
Experts blamed this expansion to infused increase in the equity base of the HLIs and also
warned of severe de-leveraging if and when asset prices were to fall, which happened exactly
in 2008, the bubble would burst.
Among the predominant assets acquired in this lending boom were securitised sub-prime
mortgages designed to ensure that poorer families could get cheaper and affordable housing.
The basic idea of a sub-prime loan discovered that the dominant form of wealth of low-income
households is potentially their home equity. If borrowers can lend to these households for a
short span of time, say two to three years, at a high, but affordable interest rate, equity shall be
accumulated in form of their homes. Subsequently the mortgage can be refinanced with a
lower loan-to-value ratio, reflecting the embedded price appreciation. So, the mortgages were
structured in such a fashion that sub-prime lenders effectively have an (implicit) option on
house prices. After the initial period of two to three years, there is a step-up interest rate, such
that the borrowers basically are induced to get a refinance and the lender had the option to
provide a new mortgage depending on the appreciation in the value of such house.
18 Rethinking Capital Regulation∆, Kashyap, A.K., R. Rajan and J.C Stein, 2008.
19 Liquidity and financial cycles∆, Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin, 2007, Mimeo Princeton University.
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However, the basic defect that lurked in and was egregiously overlooked that buying
securities backed by sub-prime loans (so-called ABSs), shadow banks were acquiring assets with
substantial «tail risk». Moreover house prices being substantially above the equilibrium a process
of correction in housing prices would wipe out the option values embedded in the trenches of
ABSs - leading to the fear of insolvency of such banks. This was again supplemented with a view
that bursting of the house price bubble could create a systemic crisis.20 The US housing capital
market ruined by such sub prime mortgages and loans was basically a victim of a speculative
bubble, where assets are held largely for capital gain and of how the programmes written for
pricing mortgage-backed assets failed account for the possibility of house prices falling.

IV. SEEKING TO REDRESS THE ≈BUBBLE TROUBLE∆
Post September 2008, the world saw the collapse of several key market players like
Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers, like Government»s incessantly strived to save major Banks
with their popular bail out plans. While most of the bail out plans, aimed at injecting huge
amount of money into their financial system, the national emergency plan essentially covered
three aspects: First, lowering national gearing, essentially because leveraging adds risks, especially
if this is leveraged from external borrowing, as the more you borrow from abroad the more you
become vulnerable to external shocks; Secondly, the higher the level of domestic savings, reflected
in higher bank capital and lower credit/GDP ratio, the greater shall be the resilience to the pain
of adjustment to external or internal shocks and Thirdly, irrespective of the exchange rate
regime, there must be a commitment to a stable currency, which meant strong external reserves,
low inflation and a sound banking system.
The above points essentially arise out of the guidelines prescribed after the Asian Financial
Crisis, to include:21
Credible policies, with monetary and fiscal policies consistent with each other, both in policy
and its application.
Appropriately phased Capital account liberalization
Sound fundamentals incorporating a high domestic savings rate, sustainable fiscal and balance
of payments positions, high foreign exchange reserves and prudent debt management system.
Good supervision involving the maintenance of solid capital adequacy and liquidity
requirements for the financial sector, as well as regular examination and monitoring of
financial institutions and markets. A healthy banking system having the capacity to avoid
excessive credit concentrations and risks and to manage market risks.
20 The Panic of 2007", Gary Gorton, 2008, Yale School of Management and NBER, Prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, Jackson Hole Conference, August 2008, accessible at«http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2008/gorton.08.04.08.pdf.
21 Bank Restructuring: Lessons from the 1980s∆,Sheng, Andrew, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996.
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A robust financial infrastructure encompassing an efficient payments and settlements system
for domestic and international transactions. In essence, to reduce payment risks and allow
central bank to monitor flows in domestic currency as well as exposure of banks on real
time basis.
A non-warped incentive structure, such as taxation or regulatory restrictions that does not
encourage risk concentrations or excessive leverage in any economic sectors.
While the world debated on ways to avoid the bubble trap, a few other alternatives were
suggested for rectifying the present global doom syndrome.

a. Debt Equity Swap
Capital restructuring frequently involves a debt-equity swap, where lenders become owners
and relieving the borrowers of collateral requirements and interest payment obligations.22 In
simple terms, the old equity holders are wiped out and the old debt claims are altered into
equity claims in the new entity which continues to operate with a new capital structure.
Alternatively, the debt-holders can also agree to cut down the face value of debt, in exchange
for some warrants. This has also been witnessed in the model credit cycle developed by Kiyotaki
and Moore, which was originally designed to show that real shocks would have much more
persistent effects on the economy than what is usually foreseen and deliberated on how debts
must be collateralized due to moral hazard, and dumping collateral generates significant negative
externalities.23

b. Capital Injection
A key feature of the UK rescue plan has been the provision of (voluntary) capital injections
in form of preference shares or unsecured debt. This is primarily aimed to curb financial meltdown
by checking the de-leveraging process that follows a shock to net worth, and so limiting the
negative externality of asset sales, while at the same time ensuring avoidance of the threat to
solvency posed by massive fire-sales of collateral assets.

c. Loan Write Downs
A loan write-down is another way of avoiding the negative externalities caused by loan
enforcement programs. Governments can come up with policies for their Banks or Financial
Institutions whereby the bankruptcy reform so proposed would allow for homeowners to write
22 Why Paulson is wrong∆: Economists Voice, Zingales, Luigi, 2008, The Berkeley Electronic Press.
23 Credit Cycles∆, Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and John Moore, Journal of Political Economy, 105, 1997.
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down the value of their homes and stay in their houses. [Furthermore], the government could
assume part of the mortgage, taking advantage of the lower interest rate at which it has access
to funds and its greater ability to demand repayment. In return for the lower interest rate √
which would make housing more affordable √ it could demand from the homeowner the
conversion of the loan into a recourse loan (reducing the likelihood of default), and from the
original holders of the mortgage, a write down of the value of the mortgage to say 90% of the
current market price.24

V. THE GREAT DEBATE ON MONETARY POLICY
While various alternatives have been provided to curb the great ≈bubble debacle∆, the
main debate still hovers on whether Monetary Policy plays the most essential role in determining/
curbing the volatility and formation of the asset price bubble? It is to be understood that, it is
not merely legal restructuring that can ameliorate the conditions of those who have borrowed
heavily against overvalued assets whose prices are being «corrected». Timely adjustment of
interest rates can also help. The idea is simple enough√ to stabilise the prices of those assets
whose collapsing values are threatening the system. A cut in real interest rates at the time the
bubble bursts and thereafter will generate a transfer from lenders to borrowers, and help to
limit the fire-sales at the root of the crisis.
However, the present analysis is much complex than it appears to be as economists
divide themselves on the role of Monetary Policy in determining asset price bubbles.
It is argued that the role of Central Banks is to manage inflation and the former does it
via their Monetary Policy. While the economies around the world benefited immensely from
this Central Bank focus on inflation, certain eyebrows were raised as the Philips Curve, strived
a trade-off between inflation and unemployment that again undermined the role of inflation.
However, these arguments were put to rest by Milton Friedman in 1970 at American Economic
Association where he displayed that there was no trade-off between inflation and
unemployment. Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon∆ and monetary
economics didn»t look back since then.
Despite separate regulators, Central banks continue to be an essential part of financial
markets. Central banks regulate money supply via Banks who in turn are an integral part of
financial system. Hence, monitoring financial system becomes an automatic responsibility of
the Central Bank, which also acts as regulators of various types of financial markets- debt
24 We aren»t done yet: Comments on the financial crises and Bailout∆, Stiglitz, Joseph E, 2008, Economists» Voice: The Berkeley
Electronic Press, (October).
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markets, currency markets etc. Most Central Banks release their outlook on financial markets
along with that of the economy. It provides financial market participants a number of cues on
the developments in financial markets.
Further, in countries like India, with the Central Bank (Reserve Bank of India) raising the
cash reserve ratio of Banks, in apprehension and fretting about the ever-growing inflation,
especially about the high prices of assets like stocks and land, has led economists to wonder
whether it is apt for central banks to assume that there is a bubble and proceed to prick it? This
in turn has again led to re-opening of the great debate of the role of Central Banks in determining
the financial statistics of the country.
Economists all over the world, stand divided on this issue and this has been evident from
the research works of Nouriel Roubini of Roubini Economics,25 who said that Central banks
should √ indeed must √ prick bubbles, in comparison to the views of Adam S Posen, a senior
fellow at the Institute for International Economics, who was of the opinion that they should
not, since bubbles can be caused by many factors and not just monetary ones.
Roubini»s (several) arguments are based on the notion that central banks should prevent
bubbles from bursting rather than merely react after they burst to limit the damage. He says
that economic theory ≈supports the idea of targeting the asset prices and asset bubbles∆, and
no one really knows whether there is a bubble or not. This uncertainty by itself is not enough
reason for central banks not to act. The real issue is whether an optimal monetary policy rule
should depend on the degree of uncertainty. So ≈even if monetary authorities cannot separate
with certainty the two components of an asset price √ the one based on fundamentals and the
other not √ the optimal policy response implies reacting to the overall asset price (as opposed
to reacting separately to its two fundamental and non-fundamental components).∆ √ Essentially
the view taken by Reserve Bank of India.
Posen, on the other hand, takes the diametrically opposite view, by saying that ≈Central
banks should not be in the business of trying to prick asset price bubbles because the connection
between monetary conditions and the rise of bubbles is rather tenuous∆. Thus, if central banks
get up to their usual tactics, like raising interest rates or reducing the amount available to the
banks for lending, they will only cause a recession. ≈The cost-benefit analysis∆, says Posen,
≈hardly justifies such preemptive action∆.
However while ascertaining that there is no monetary substitute for financial stability
and no market substitute for monetary ease during severe credit crunch, the underlying
assumption that is taken by Posen is that there exists a good banking supervision system, as if
25 Why Central Banks Should Burst Bubbles∆, Roubini, Nouriel, 2006, International Finance Journal.
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the financial system is fragile, the central bank can land the economy in trouble by not acting
in time. It appears that in India, the Reserve Bank has taken this very caveat to defend its stand
and by emphasizing on the fact that the present banking system is not robust, its intervention
is much required. However, we feel that such a defense is not sufficient to justify the intervention
of Central Banks in determining a monetary policy that seeks to curb asset price bubble at the
very outset, i.e., as a pre-emptive action.
The recent sub prime crisis and the oil/ commodity price has lead to opinions that easy
monetary policy also contributes to rising asset prices. The higher demand for houses leads to
higher prices leading to higher wealth. This leads to higher consumption and it has been observed
that a part of the proceedings are invested in equity/commodity markets as well. This leads to
rise in equity prices as well. Alternatively, people can invest directly in equity and commodities
markets by taking loans at low rates fueling the rise in asset prices and then invest the proceeds
in housing markets. As the interest rate cycle reverses, the corrections are felt across asset
markets. However, till the recent crisis the Central Banks have not really been concerned, as the
magnitude has been small but the sub-prime crisis is the time to reassess the policies. The
≈need to target asset prices∆ theory also suggest it is not important to be precise about the size
of the bubble as long as the price bubbles can be identified. Most Central Bankers in their
speeches do express concern about rising housing prices while research has shown that Central
Banks do target asset prices implicitly. Moreover, Central Banks are the best placed in an economy
to gauge the development of irrational rise in asset prices.
There exists another school of thought who feel that Posen was indeed correct in pointing
out that the central bank should not take asset prices directly into account in monetary policy
making but laissez-faire in its approach while responding to sharp movements in inflation and
output even if asset price swings are their source. In this context it is also to be understood that,
price bubbles also arise out of other fundamental factors which the Central Bank and its policies
may fail to consider. One of such fundamentals as pointed out by Marcus Brunnermeier, is that
there exists a behavioral perspective to developments of asset bubbles, which the monetary
policy may fail to appreciate and thus, not resolve the problem of price bubbles in the realistic
sense of the term.26 Further, there also exists a fear that, Central Bank»s identification of a
bubble could lead to far more damage than expected and thus, if the Central bank raises its
policy rates to counter asset bubbles it dampens the entire economic activity, thereby deeming
monetary policy to be a bunt tool to target asset price bubbles.

26 Synchronization risk and delayed arbitrage∆, Abreu, Dilip and Markus K. Brunnermeier,2002,Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.
66(2-3), pp. 341√360.; Also See ≈Bubbles and Crashes∆,Abreu, Dilip and Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2003, Econometrica, Vol. 71(1),
pp. 173-204.
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The above analysis shows that linkages between asset prices and monetary policy are
well understood but there are no identifiable ways to manage it. This does not imply that
Central banks can ignore this problem as both financial deepening and financial innovation are
only going to exacerbate the problem. Till the sub-prime the leading institutions in their research
papers suggested that Central Banks shouldn»t target asset prices as most of the crisis happened
in developing economies. The problems identified were - weak financial systems, poor
macroeconomic policies etc. Now, with the crisis beginning in US and engulfing other developed
economies these reasons are not valid. IMF in its World Economic Outlook (April 2008) released
a report analyzing Housing markets and Monetary Policy.27

This main idea of this chapter was to examine how innovations in housing finance systems
in advanced economies over the past two decades have altered the role of the housing
sector in the business cycle and the monetary policy transmission mechanism. It concludes
that these changes have broadened the spillovers from the housing sector to the rest of
the economy and have amplified their impact by strengthening the role of housing as
collateral. This analysis suggests that in economies with more developed mortgage
markets, monetary policymakers may need to respond more aggressively to developments
in the housing sector, within a risk-management approach that treats house price
dynamics as one of the key factors to be considered in assessing the balance of risks to
output and inflation.
This has stirred an inevitable controversy as people felt that IMF was advocating the
theory that Central banks should target Asset prices. An IMF Chief Economist clarified:28

≈Monetary policy may need to respond to house price inflation especially in economies
where it is easier for households to access mortgage credit. This would fit within a broad
≈risk management∆ approach to monetary policy that recognizes all the uncertainty
surrounding the various shocks hitting the economy. The logic is that monetary policy
may need to respond to house price inflation particularly when house prices move rapidly
or out of line with normal valuation ranges.
But unfortunately the report fails to offer any constructive idea of how Central Banks
should target asset prices, but is a change of stance nevertheless. However, we feel that while
such suggestions may prima facie seem to be lucratively alluring, a deeper analysis would bring
out the inherent defects that would mar its implementation:

27 Review of Annual Statement on Monetary Policy for the Year 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, 2006.
28 Housing and Business Cycle∆, World Economic Outlook, 2008 International Monetary Fund, accesible at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/index.htm.
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a) Including Asset Prices in Inflation indices: This is the most radical proposal but has severe
limitations. Firstly, it is difficult to identify assets, which would be included. Secondly, asset
prices move randomly which could make the task of gauging inflation even difficult.
b) Pricking the Bubble: Central bank should aggressively increase interest rates to counter the
asset price rise. However, Firstly it is difficult to identify a bubble and some assets may
actually be adequately priced. Secondly, there is not a very precise relation between interest
rates and asset prices and large interest rate increases may be needed to calm asset prices
which would put entire economy under stress.
c) Leaning against the Wind Act: This approach is increasingly becoming the most accepted in the
policy arena. It simpliciter means that Central bank adopts a hawkish stance against rising asset
prices early on. This would dispel the notion that Central banks would only act in times of
distress. But there are not many ideas on how this approach can be made workable. Some
economists suggest that more restrictive credit conditions (Higher capital requirements etc) in
booms and reducing them in recessions. Some have suggested that higher margin requirement
should be placed during booms. Another idea is just like Central Banks manage inflationary
expectations by communicating to the public they can manage asset price expectations as well.
As the Central Banks across the world, strive to move beyond the inherent defects and
try and make implementation of the above Guidelines possible, the Reserve Bank of India in its
Annual monetary policy statement for the year 2006-07 stated that:29

It appears that globally as well as in India, underlying inflation conditions are perhaps
not being appropriately reflected in prices facing consumers and financing imbalances
are growing in the presence of abundant liquidity, rising asset prices and a marked
increase in risk appetite. It is in this context, and consistent with the multiple indicator
approach adopted by the Reserve Bank, that monetary policy in India has consistently
emphasized the need to be watchful about indications of rising aggregate demand
embedded in consumer and business confidence, asset prices, corporate performance,
the sizeable growth of reserve money and money supply, the rising trade and current
account deficits and, in particular, the quality of credit growth.
In retrospect, this risk sensitive approach has served us well in reining in aggregate
demand pressures and second round effects to an extent. It has also ensured that constant
vigil is maintained on threats to financial stability through a period when inflation was
on the upturn and asset prices, especially in housing and real estate, are emerging as a
challenge to monetary authorities worldwide.

29 Housing and Business Cycle∆, World Economic Outlook, 2008 International Monetary Fund, accesible at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/index.htm.
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Apart from raising concerns over asset prices, RBI has also asked banks to raise provision
requirements on loans to specific sectors like capital market exposures, housing loans and
commercial real estate. It has increased the risk weight on exposures of Banks to commercial
real estate. While, some economists feel that it was this guarded approach of RBI that prevented
India from being severely affected during the financial crisis but the opponents feel that it is a
false analogy used by RBI to substantiate its intervention which in the long run would not prove
to be fruitful.
However, with the present crisis at hand, there appears to be a general consensus in
India, with regard to the need of timely intervention of the Reserve Bank to prevent any further
debacles. However, the question which stills remains debatable is √ what is the appropriate role
of monetary policy in presence of asset-price bubbles? What methods are to be adopted to
achieve the objectives of the monetary policy? One view is that monetary policy should do no
more than follow the standard precepts of inflation targeting. Proponents of this view would
acknowledge that rising asset prices often have expansionary effects on the economy, and
might sometimes also provide a signal for incipient inflationary pressures, so that some tightening
of monetary policy might be appropriate. According to this view, however, policy should only
respond to observed changes in asset prices to the extent that they signal current or future
changes to inflation or the output gap. However the fact remains that ≈One should not attempt
to use policy either too gently against a suspected asset-price bubbles while it is growing or,
more aggressively, try to burst it.∆30
However, the growing alternative views, challenging the above notions and believing
that monetary policy should aim to do more than respond to actual and expected developments
in inflation and the output gap, have led the authors to ponder on the arguments that: ≈Raising

interest rates modestly as asset prices rise above what are estimated to be warranted levels,
and lowering interest rates modestly when asset prices fall below warranted levels, will tend to
offset the impact on output and inflation of [asset-price] bubbles, thereby enhancing overall
macroeconomic stability.∆31
This, has led the conclusion that while the present debate on the role of monetary policy
in assessing the asset price bubble is an eternal question, the present world conditions demands
a change in outlook, wherein we need to break out from the shackles of orthodox perspective
and seek to contemplate new grounds that may prove to effectively redress the issue.

30 Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility, Bernanke, Ben, and Mark Gertler, 1999, In New Challenges for Monetary Policy: A
Symposium Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City: 77√128. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
31 Asset Prices and Central Bank Policy∆, Cecchetti, Stephen G., Hans Genberg, John Lipsky, and Sushil Wadhwani,2003, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking.
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The we feel, that the anti bubble laws of developing countries like India, need to be put
onto a template, which maps onto microeconomic (including behavioral finance) and
macroeconomic research on bubble formation and seeks to include:
(1) laws that aim to provide information to investors on fundamental value of assets, essentially
capturing laws requiring enhanced disclosure or investor education either to focus investor
attention on information on fundamental value rather than noise or to remedy information
asymmetries that lead to wrong asset pricing;
(2) laws that attempt to short circuit positive feedback loops, and thereby attempt to dampen
the positive feedback created when investors chase rising asset prices and include transaction
taxes, circuit breakers and laws that attempt to restrict access of investors to certain markets
or channel less sophisticated investors to less risky assets;
(3) removal of legal restrictions on arbitrage;
(4) laws that restrict credit to investors to curb speculation (e.g., margin regulations).

VI. THE WAY FORWARD √ THE REGULATORY APPROACH
As suggested hereinabove, we feel that adapting to either view regarding the relevance
of monetary policy in curbing asset price bubbles may actually prove to be a misnomer. The
present hype has failed to appreciate that there can exist other approaches which might provide
to be an effective tool to resolve the instant problem at hand.
While the ways suggested above are essentially alternatives, which we feel could provide
respite in the present scenario but we must also appreciate that such changes cannot be brought
about without a major change in the policy of the Banks/ Financial Institutions. While a
considerable amount of research has been devoted to the question of whether or not preemptive monetary policy should be used to influence asset prices, there has been comparatively
much less discussion of the effectiveness, desirability and nature of pre-emptive regulatory
policy in this context.32
We base our view points on the following three main propositions, namely:
(i) Monetary policy is either inappropriate or relatively ineffective in bursting bubbles;
(ii) Pro-cyclicality of the financial system can be reduced with appropriate regulatory policies;
and
(iii) A strong banking system that correctly measures and prices risk can reduce the likelihood of
asset price bubbles developing.
32 Asset Price Bubbles and Prudential Regulation∆, Working Paper 3, September 2001, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority,
accessible at http://www.apra.gov.au/Policy/upload/Asset-Price-Bubbles-and-Prudential-Regulation-Sep2001.pdf.
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It is understandable that asset prices can and do fall sharply from time to time and that
these falls cause severe economic disruption; irrespective of whether these falls are simply
excessive price swings or genuine bubbles. But the focus is primarily on the relationship between
these price movements and the behaviour of banks in which prudential regulation might affect
that relationship. Following are certain evidences to supplement such theory:
Bubbles actually cause damage to the real economy;
A reliable relationship exists between the formation/bursting of bubbles and the behaviour
of banks; and
Regulation can influence the behaviour without material side effects, either for the economy
or for the other objectives of prudential regulation.
It had been argued by Kindleberger,33 way back in 1989 that asset price bubbles are
often, although not always, related to banking crises and are typically fuelled by some form of
monetary expansion and his findings were supported by empirical evidence that bank failures
are inversely correlated with the business cycle. This view was later strengthened by Allen and
Gale34 who argued that the existence of agency costs in the banking sector, combined with
uncertainty about future credit expansion, determines the extent of asset price bubbles and
subsequent effects on the real economy.
In view of the above, economists based their opinions against the use of monetary
policy to control or burst bubbles, and economists like Bernanke and Gertler (1999), through
their Dynamic New Keynesian∆ model, showed that monetary policy should not respond to
changes in asset prices, except when asset prices signal changes in inflationary expectations.35
The bursting of an asset price bubble that does not have implications for expected inflation
is strongly rejected by the Bernanke and Gertler model. Using collateral constrained ≈Dynamic
New Keynesian∆ model, Bordo and Jeanne (2001) showed that, in the event of a sudden
decline in asset prices, monetary policy may be ineffective in increasing output and, further,
that the pre-emptive use of monetary policy is likely to be ineffective in avoiding a market
crash.36 In addition, Kaufman (1998) also argues against the use of monetary policy to burst
bubbles and Schwartz (2001) argues that monetary policy is not only ineffective, it is
inappropriate for bursting bubbles, on the grounds that, unless the bubble has been caused
33 Anatomy of a Typical Financial Crisis∆, Charles Kindleberger, 1989, accessible athttp://delong.typepad.com/egregious_moderation/
2009/01/charles-kindleberger-anatomy-of-a-typical-financial-crisis.html.
34 Financial Contagion∆, Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 1. (Feb., 2000), accessible at
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28200002%29108%3A1%3C1%3AFC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D.
35 Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility, Bernanke, Ben, and Mark Gertler, 1999, In New Challenges for Monetary Policy: A
Symposium Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City: 77√128. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
36 Asset Price, Reversals, Economic Instability, and Monetary Policy∆, Bordo, M.D. and O. Jeanne, (2001), Paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Financial Association, New Orleans, January 7, 2001.
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by lax monetary conditions, market prices should correct themselves based on projections of
earnings growth.37
While a dissenting voice came from economists like Kent and Lowe (1997), later theories
(including that of Kent and Lowe) have affirmed the usage of prudential regulation to respond
to bubbles,38 namely:
Borio et al suggest that one benefit of using prudential regulation to respond to asset price
bubbles is that the costs of poor regulatory policy choices are likely to be smaller than the
cost of poor monetary policy choices; they also argue that the effects of regulatory policy
changes are more predictable.
Bordo and Jeanne suggest capital requirements and risk-based deposit insurance should be
used to account for capital losses from a sudden fall in asset prices, although their arguments
is in favour of regulations (and fiscal policy) which are based more on demonstrating the
ineffectiveness of monetary policy, rather than demonstrating the effectiveness of regulation.
Kent and Lowe suggest that prudential regulation may support monetary policy by minimizing
the adverse impact of asset price bubbles on the financial system which, in turn, ensures
that the banking system is healthy and not overexposed to the risks associated with the
bursting of a bubble.
However, how prudential tools might be used to deal with bubbles is a question still
unanswered. Supervisors assess and influence risk taking in financial institutions through a
range of qualitative and quantitative methods. These techniques include restrictions on portfolio
composition, risk-based capital requirements, loan loss provisioning, and stress testing of market
risk exposures. Although, proponents across the world feel that regulatory policies are the
most effective ways of curbing asset price bubbles, we feel that there are certain latent defects
which might seek to weaken the very root of these proposals and thereby render them ineffective,
especially in developing countries like India. Therefore, if such policies are to be effectively
implemented, the following defects are to be appropriately addressed within a reasonable time
frame.
(i) Restrictions on Portfolio Composition: Portfolio restrictions have historically been used as a
tool for both bank supervision and monetary policy. To limit the risk of asset price bubbles,
Schwartz (2001) suggested that regulations should be particularly concerned with bank portfolio
composition and give financial institutions an incentive for self regulation by linking deposit
insurance premiums to a benchmark asset portfolio, where the weights for loans secured by
37 Asset Price Inflation and Monetary Policy∆,Schwartz, A. J.,(2001),Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Financial
Association, New Orleans, 7 January.
38 Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy»,Kent, C. and P. Lowe, 1997, Reserve Bank of Australia, Research Discussion Paper 9709.
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each class are set by the regulator. The argument for influencing portfolio composition in a way
is based on the US experience of the 1920s and more recently the Japanese experience of the
1980s. In both periods, shifts in bank lending towards the funding of speculative investment in
equity and property markets facilitated the asset price booms and left their respective financial
systems in critically weakened positions when the magical boom period finished.
Defects:
The construction of a suitable set of weights for the benchmark portfolio is problematic.
Substituting the judgment of regulators with the judgment of the bank management √
something that runs counter to the risk-based philosophy that has been emerging in banking
regulation over recent decades.
High-growth industries, by definition, tend to make greater demands on new credit in
comparison to stable or declining industries. A decision to effectively limit the amount of
new credit supplied to a particular sector may inhibit growth in areas of the economy in
which the country has a genuine comparative advantage.
(ii) Capital Adequacy: Minimum capital ratios have been a mainstay of banking regulation for
many years and many proponents like Kaufman (1999) have pointed out that high leverage of
banks are the source of bank failures and suggested that increasing the required minimum
capital ratio is a relatively costless but effective way of insulating banks from the bubble ruptures.
The assertion that additional capital is effectively costless is based on the proposition that
regulated banks are able to exploit lower capital ratios than unregulated institutions because of
their implicit government guarantee through deposit insurance and brings along with itself the
recommendation of a wider application of structured early intervention, with higher trigger
capital ratios as a fundamental element of this strategy.
Defects:
While Kaufman may be correct that alteration to the capital ratio of banks is largely a
pricing issue from the perspective of the markets, the cost of credit is not independent of
the debt/equity combination of the bank. Raising the required capital ratio is likely to result
in either a rise in the price or a reduction in the availability of credit.
There is no guidance in the present framework to show as to how much capital would be
sufficient.
It is also to be remembered that the proposal of structured early intervention is not universally
accepted. There is a strong case for its application in countries where regulatory forbearance
has resulted in repeated losses, or in which banks are particularly uncooperative in working
through problems with their regulators. Although, India stands at a good platform when it
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comes to its relationship with its regulators, the benefits of structured early intervention are
very much situation specific.
While higher capital requirements and structured early intervention may reduce the cost of
bursting bubbles, they do not address the questions of why bubbles form and how these
might be prevented.
(iii) Loan Loss Provisioning: During an economic expansion, bank credit increases, while loan
losses and provisions for loan losses typically fall. This counter-cyclical tendency for provisions
arises because traditional provisioning methodology, based on fixed and specific provisions,
tends to be backward looking, rather than based on future expected losses. The traditional
approach towards provisioning for loan is based on the view that provisions should reduce the
value of loan assets to the lower cost and net realizable value. Under this approach provisions
are not generally established until a loan is recognized as impaired. The behaviour of reserves
under the traditional approach accentuates the boom and the bust cycle and can therefore
contribute both to creating price bubbles and to bursting them. In recent years, however,
banks have begun adopting variations of what is known as ≈Dynamic Provisioning∆. The
philosophy underlying dynamic provisioning is that provisions should cover expected losses,
while capital should be available to cover the unexpected losses. Dynamic provisioning recognizes
expected losses as a cost of being in the business of making loans. Under this line of thought,
for a bank not recognize expected losses, ≈is equivalent to an insurance company writing
premiums and then hoping that no one will claim∆.39
Defects:
The counter-cyclical nature of the traditional provisioning methodology has raised concerns
for the regulators;
Despite the Basel Committee recommendations on the concept of expected loss, provisioning
tends to remain generally reactive rather than anticipative, for reasons largely related to tax
and accounting rules in various jurisdictions;
The concept of dynamic provisioning has not met with a lot of takers and hence not accepted
as genuine alternative.

VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The framework used here is very much an iconic «reduced form»: it would be more
satisfactory to model the process of intermediation explicitly, for example - to take international
39 Managing Bank Capital»,Matten, C, 2000, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.,West Sussex.
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dimensions into account. But the message is clear enough - that credit conditions influence
economies enormously and emergency steps to restructure balance sheets through policy
revamping are crucial for fixing problems of excessive leverage. This stands in sharp contrast to
the view from conventional models - that «the effects of a worsening of financial intermediation
are likely to be limited» and can be handled by interest rate cuts alone.
Paul de Grauwe»s warning40 - conventional models fail to connect with the issues at
hand - carries another message. It is not only the bank balance sheets that have to be
restructured: the micro-foundations of macroeconomics needs similar treatment along with
policy overhaul; and acknowledging the fact that regulatory frameworks have a much deeper
effect in affecting asset price bubbles than monetary policies.
In the alternative regulatory policy approach, we have strived to examine three possible
regulatory responses to managing bubbles: portfolio restrictions; adjustments in capital
requirements; and adjustments in provisioning requirements, to conclude that:
The first approach, of setting portfolio composition restrictions, is contrary to the principles
of modern risk-based banking supervision and potentially costly in terms of its impact on
economic efficiency.
While there is a case for using adjustments in capital adequacy as a counter-cyclical tool, the
efficiency costs arising from imprecision militate against it.
A stronger case exists for introducing a counter-cyclical provisioning regime along the lines
pioneered largely on the pro-cyclical tendencies of the traditional approach towards
provisioning and also on the fact that the counter-cyclical provisioning approach is compatible
with the sort of outcomes that should be produced by a cyclically adjusted dynamic
provisioning model.
Finally we found that that the role for financial regulation in controlling the emergence of,
and damage from, assets price bubbles remains relatively limited.
Although the regulatory model suggested, does not promise to be a definitive coverage
of the role of prudential regulations, in controlling the emergence of asset price bubbles and
the financial damage from their aftermath, it mainly strives to throw light on 3 moot points,
namely, (1) bubbles impose a cost on the economy; (2) there is a vibrant relationship between
bubbles and the behaviour of banks; and (3) this relationship could be managed without undue
cost through appropriate regulation. And this, we feel would go a long way in chalking out an
effective alternative for curbing the asset bubble debacle especially in developing countries like
India.
40 As cited in ≈Asset Price Bubbles and Prudential Regulation∆, Working Paper 3, September 2001, Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority, accessible at http://www.apra.gov.au/Policy/upload/Asset-Price-Bubbles-and-Prudential-Regulation-Sep2001.pdf.
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM REPEATED FINANCIAL CRISES:
AN ISLAMIC ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
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Abstract
Financial crises have been repeated again and again over a long period of time since the demise of
gold regime in 1915, have been temporarily subsided in the period under Bretton Woods Agreement
with gold standard in 1950-1972, and have been reemerged after the collapse of Bretton Woods Agreement
with higher frequency and magnitude. The recent subprime mortgage crisis in the US has spread out
throughout the world threatening global meltdown. It seems that the conventional world have not really
learned the lessons and have handled the crisis only partially in the symptoms without touching the root
cause of the crisis. This study tries to determine the anatomy and root causes of the crisis and layout
strategies to cure it using analytic descriptive and quantitative approaches under Islamic perspectives.
The study concludes that the root causes of the crisis from Islamic economic perspective can be
human error and natural phenomenon uncontrollable by human. Human error can be divided into three
groups, namely (1) moral decadences that trigger (2) system or conceptual flaws and (3) internal weaknesses.
Conceptual system flaws include 1) excess money supply from seigniorage, fractional reserve banking
system, credit card and derivatives; 2) Speculation; 3) interest system; 4) international monetary system;
and 5) real and monetary sectors decoupling.
Empirical results show that riba rooted causes of financial crises (excess money supply 2.8%, interest
rate 45.2%, and exchange rate 18.6%) give 66.6% share to financial crises in Indonesia, while if we
substitute these three systems according to Islamic perspective (just money supply 0.7%, PLS return
2.5%, and single global currency 0.2%) will give only 3.4% share to financial crises in Indonesia, or a
massive reduction of 63.2%.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I.1. Background
Financial crises have occurred one after another since the demise of gold standard regime
in 1915. The crises started with depression in Japan (1920), hyper inflation in Germany (19221923), and finally manifested into the great depression in 1929-1930 (Davies and Davies, 1996).
Subsequently, financial crisis have hit Austria (banking crisis in 1931), France (hyper inflation in
1944-1966), Hungary (hyper inflation and monetary crisis in 1944-1946), German (hyper inflation
in 1945-1946), and Nigeria (banking crisis in 1945-1955).
The crises have subsided in the period under Bretton Woods Agreements in 1950-1972,
with strict fixed exchange rate international monetary arrangements where US Dollar as world
currency is pegged to gold (one troy ounce of gold is equal to 35 US Dollar) while other currencies
are pegged to US Dollar, with the guarantee that US Dollar is exchangeable to gold in any time.
The Bretton Woods era is known as a golden age, where personal income increases, the volume
of world trade increases, investment increases, and international economic stability maintained.
David Felix stated that there is no long period of time, in the past or present which is comparable
or closely resemble to the achievement (the high production, high productivity, low
unemployment, and just distributive income) of Bretton Woods era.
The Bretton Woods agreements finally collapsed in 1971, when the US unilaterally
terminated the convertibility of US Dollar to gold. The US enjoyed huge seigniorage profits
from printing fiat currency without gold back up. Other countries finally followed the US to use
fiat money and adopted floating exchange rate. Following the collapse of Bretton Woods
Agreements, financial crises have resurfaced more frequently started in England (banking crisis
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in 1973-74), industrial countries (deep recession in 1978-1980), developing countries (debt
crises in 1980-1982), US and UK (great crash of stock exchange in 1987), Mexico (financial
crisis in 1994), Asian countries, Russia, Brazil and Argentina (financial crisis and hyper inflation
in 1997-1999), and finally the current subprime mortgage crisis in the US that has spread out
all over the world.
Since the collapse of Bretton Woods Agreements there have already been more than 96
financial crises and 176 monetary crises (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996) that happened not because
of cyclical or managerial failures, but because of structural failures in various countries under
very different regulatory systems as well as at different stages of economic development (Lietaer
et al., 2008). However, the conventional solutions taken only deal with the symptoms, not the
root systemic causes of the crisis. A new database of financial crises in the period of 1970-2007
can be read in Laeven and Valencia (2008) that covers 395 episodes of financial crises (banking
crisis, currency crisis and sovereign debt crisis), including 42 twin crises and 10 triple crises.
It seems that they have not learned the lessons yet on how to eradicate and/or control
the financial crisis. Even though the crisis has been repeated again and again, none of those
countries that has become economically stronger and more stable. In Indonesian multidimensional crisis in 1997-1998, inflation has jumped up to 77.6%, while economic growth
has slumped to -13.2% (Hatta, 2008). All sectors in the economy have contracted significantly.
Construction sector has contracted 36.4%, while financial sector has contracted 26.6%.
Therefore, there should be a comprehensive and holistic study to determine the detailed anatomy
and the root causes of the crisis to be able to cure the crisis permanently and to avoid the
similar mistakes in the future, so that crisis will not be repeated again.

I.2. Objectives
This study will determine descriptively the detailed anatomy and the root causes of the
crisis based on conventional and Islamic perspectives, and propose systemic steps to eradicate
and control financial crisis. Subsequently, to provide some empirical evidences, this study will
test empirically some root causes of the crisis in Indonesia.

I.3. Data and Methodology
The data used in this study is secondary time series quarterly data collected from various
institutions, especially Bank Indonesia and Biro Pusat Statistik, for the period of January of
2002 to September of 2008. The methodology applied will be Vector Auto Regression (VAR),
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followed by Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), if cointegration occurred. In the qualitative
part of the study, analytic descriptive method will be applied based on data and literatures.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
II.1. The Origin of Financial Crisis
The financial crisis was originated from the debasement of metallic currencies that caused
hyper inflation. Roman gold coins Aureus (7 grams of gold alloyed with silver) and Solidus (4.4
grams, of which 4.2 grams was gold) and Byzantine gold coins were frequently alloyed with
other metals of much lower value to create the seigniorage necessary for a rational system of
government money.
During the Prophet Muhammad»s (SAW) time, debasement of currency in all forms was
strictly forbidden. The Umayyad ruler Caliph Marwan ibn al-Hakam (65-66 H/684-685 M) had
a man»s hand cut off for cutting up a Dirham or silver currency (Sanusi, 2002).
Meanwhile, English pound that comprised 240 silver pennies in 11th century, by 1666
was being minted into more than 700 pennies at the Royal Mint (El-Diwany, 2002). Later in 14th
century, hyper inflation in Egypt occurred due to overly minted Fulus (copper or bronze) currency
by the government. In the time of Sultan Al-Dzahir Burquq (Utsmaniah Empire 781 H), the use
of alloyed silver minted by Sultan al-Dzahir Baibras was cancelled and replaced with copper
Fulus.
Meanwhile, following its foundation in 1694, Bank of England (BoE) issued «paper receipts/
money» backed by 100 percent gold or silver and fully convertible upon demand. Later on, BoE
issued paper money or bank notes on certain reserve ratio, so that paper money supply far
exceeded the underlying gold or silver. Consequently, the first two crises of the century in 1825
and 1837 in England were due to over issue of bank notes. In 1254 H Utsmaniah Empire, paper
money ≈al-Qa»imah∆ was issued and lasted for 23 years. In 1278 H, the circulation of alQa»imah was suspended due to too much al-Qa»imah in circulation. Meanwhile in 1934, the
US Dollar was devalued from 23.22 grains of gold to 13.714 grains of gold by order of President
Roosevelt (El-Diwani, 2002).
Inspired by the crises in England, David Hume (1711-1766 M) proposed a theory of
«beneficial inflation» with the hypothesis that increasing the money supply would raise production
in the short run and may not raise the price at all in the long run. But, John Maynard Keynes
(1883-1946 M) was «the father of inflation» who in 1936 (in his magnum opus, The general
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money)£successfully developed Hume»s idea into formalized
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model of what the Austrian school called «inflation economics». His «inflation economics»,
although severely criticized by Austrian school, has been adopted by most today»s government
all over the world, and has caused repeated financial crises.
Therefore, inflationary and crisis prone economic development paradigm is a deliberate
ideological and political choice of «economic regime» adopted by the government to profit
from seigniorage income obtained by merely minting undervalued metallic currency or printing
valueless paper currency that function as «legal» tender or money.

II.2. The Theory of Financial Crisis
In general, contemporary economic crisis occurs due to one or a combination of several
types of crises, such as banking crisis, exchange rate crisis, sovereign debt crisis, balance of
payment crisis, financial crisis, monetary crisis, stock market crash, bubble economy, and hyper
inflation. Economic crisis can trigger or triggered by political and social crises. Economic crisis
will cause economic contraction that subsequently will lead to stagnation, recession, depression,
unemployment, deprivation, starvation, death, as well as other economic, social and political
problems and instability.
The most frequently occurred crises are various types of financial crisis, such as banking
crisis, exchange rate crisis, and sovereign debt crisis. The underlying theory of financial crisis
has been widely discussed in conventional economic literatures, but has not been discussed
much in Islamic economic literatures. The next sub-section will discuss the theory of financial
crisis under conventional and Islamic economic perspectives.

II.2.1. Financial Crisis under Conventional Economic Perspective
The financial crisis can happen in various conditions where several financial institutions or
assets loss most of their values. The crisis event can be in the form of financial distress, banking
panic or systemic banking crisis, stock market crash, bursting of financial bubble, currency crash,
balance of payments distress, sovereign debt default, or a combination of two or more events.
a. Types of Financial Crisis
Types of financial crisis in conventional economic literatures include currency crisis or
balance of payments/BOP crisis, banking crisis, sovereign debt crisis, and stock/asset market
crash. In reality, financial crisis in a country comprises of two or more types that occur
simultaneously or successively.
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1. Currency Crisis or BOP Crisis
Currency crisis or BOP crisis occurs when the value of a currency depreciates quickly2, so
that undermines its ability to serve as a medium of exchange or a store of value, due to
excess demand of foreign currencies (usually in US Dollar or Euro) that cannot be satisfied
by foreign reserves of the country. If the country adopts fixed exchange regime, the
government is forced to devalue its currency and/or to adopt floating exchange regime. The
buyers of foreign currency are usually foreign investors who try to flee their assets or capital
to safety, which makes country»s balance of payments excessively run a deficit. Examples of
currency crisis are 1994 Peso crisis in Mexico, 1997 Asian financial crisis (Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia and Korea), 1998 financial crisis in Russia, and 1999 financial crisis in Brazil and
Argentina.
2. Banking Crisis
Banking crisis occurs when a commercial bank suffers a sudden rush of withdrawals (or a
bank runs) by many of its depositors. Bank runs can happen since commercial bank operates
under fractional reserve banking system, in which bank can make loan more than the
deposits received and bank extends loan in long term but receives deposits in short term,
so that there is always a mismatch in maturity. Systemic banking crisis happens when
bank runs become widespread. If bank runs are not widespread, but the banks are reluctant
to extend loan, this situation is called credit crunch. Moreover, in most cases systemic
banking crisis is a general realization that systemically important financial institutions are
in distress (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). Examples of banking crisis are 1931 banking
crisis in the US, 1945-1955 banking crisis in Nigeria, 1973-1974 banking crisis in the UK,
1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, 2007 run on Northern Rock, and 2008 collapse of Bear
Stearns.
3. Sovereign Debt Default
Sovereign debt default happens when a country fails to repay its debt to other countries
(bilateral debt) or to international institutions (multilateral debt). Sovereign debt default
usually follows by debt relief and/or debt restructuring and/or debt rescheduling. Examples
of this type of crisis includes 1980 LDCs debt crises, 1980 debt crisis in Poland, and 1982
debt crisis in Mexico (followed by Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela).
4. Stock/Asset Market Crash
Stock/asset market crash happens when overvalued prices of stocks or other financial assets
are drop drastically in a short period of time. Overvalued price means that the price of the
asset exceeds the values of its future income. Assets are traded with inflated values. In other
2 Laeven and Valencia (2008) define currency crisis as a nominal depreciation of the currency of at least 30 percent that is also at least
a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation compared to the year before.
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words there exist price bubbles of assets that inevitably burst. This situation happens when
market players choose to seek capital gains rather than dividends, which means that market
players are not real investors, but merely speculators. Some examples of this type of crisis
are 1929 Wall Street Crash, 1987 stock market crash in the US and the UK, 2008 global
stock market crashes in many countries.
Financial crisis is called twin crises when banking crisis and currency crisis happen
simultaneously or consecutively, while financial crisis is called triple crisis when banking crisis,
currency crisis and sovereign debt crisis happen simultaneously or consecutively (Laeven and
Valencia, 2008). Indonesian financial crisis in 1997-1998 was an example of triple crises, which
was a combination of currency crisis, banking crisis, stock market crash, followed by sovereign
debt default in 1999.
When a financial crisis of one country spreads to other neighboring country (contagion
effect), it is called regional financial crisis. When a financial crisis of one country spreads widely
to other countries in other part of the world, it is called global financial crisis. This can happen
due to integrated and borderless global financial system, so that financial assets movements
from one country to another can be done without any barrier. Asian financial crisis in 19971998 was an example of regional financial crisis started by the collapse of Thailand Baht followed
by the collapse of Malaysian Ringgit, Indonesian Rupiah, the Philippines Peso, and Korean
Won. Meanwhile, 2007 subprime mortgage crisis in the US, which has spread out to many
developed and developing countries all over the world until today, has been the example of
global financial crisis.
Financial crisis erupted in financial sector can be isolated in financial sector and not
affected other sector of the economy, such as 1987 stock market crash in the US. However,
in many instances, financial crisis is believed to have impact on the decline of economic
growth of the country, which means that financial crisis has spread to other sectors, especially
the real sector, since banks are unable to extend loan or financing to productive activities.
Moreover, aggregate demand declines due to the decline in buying power, unemployment
increases due to bankruptcy of businesses, and so on, which at the end financial crisis leads
to a wider economic crisis. Prolonged financial crisis not only will slow the economic growth
down, but also will cause the economic growth to halt (stagnation). Furthermore, financial
crisis can cause recession and even depression. Global financial crisis in 1929-1930 is called
the Great Depression since it caused economic depression in many countries in different part
of the world. Meanwhile, current on going global financial crisis has caused recession in
many countries.
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b. Theories
The theory of financial crisis under conventional economic perspective mostly views the
crisis from macro perspective, which is developed from first generation model, second generation
model, and third generation model. Other alternative theories include world system theory,
Minsky»s theory, coordination game, herding model and learning model.
First generation model views financial crisis is originated from currency crisis or balance
of payments crisis, which is caused by macroeconomic imbalances due to weak economic
fundamentals. Under this model, the collapse of fixed exchange regime is due to unsustainable
fiscal policy. This model was first proposed by Krugman (1979) and later by Flood and Garber
(1984), which incorporate consumer optimization and government»s intertemporal budget
constraint. Under fixed exchange rate regime the government should set the amount of money
supply fixed in accordance with fixed exchange rate. This requirement would severely limit the
ability of the government to raise seigniorage revenue from printing fiat money. Therefore,
when the government runs persistent primary deficits, it has to use foreign reserves or borrow
continuously. In the long run, this is not feasible, so that the government would have to print
more money, which would lead to the collapse of fixed exchange regime. This model could not
explain Asian financial crisis where despite sound economic fundamentals, these countries still
experienced crises.
The second generation model is developed based on the drawbacks of the first
generation model and suggests the central role of expectations and coordination failure
among creditors, so the crisis can occur independent of soundness of economic fundamentals.
This model was first proposed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1986). When investors have doubts
about whether the government is willing to maintain its exchange rate peg, this model
generally will exhibit multiple equilibria, so speculative attacks due to self-fulfilling prophecies
may be possible. This means the reason investors attack the currency is that they expect
other investors to attack the currency. Ali (2007) mentioned that in the context of a banking
crisis it means that irrespective of solvent position of a bank (or of the banking sector as a
whole) if a random event can adversely change the collective expectations of the depositors
(i.e., its creditors) then it can precipitate a run on the bank and on the banking system. Thus
there can be a range of economic fundamentals over which this type of a pure liquidity crisis
can occur. These models are deficient from policy perspective in two ways. First, they do not
predict why and when crisis may strike because it is based on some random event generating
a sudden coordination of expectations. Second, they do not inform us what to do to contain
the crisis.
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The third generation model is built on the shortcomings of the second generation model
by redefining the fundamentals more broadly to include micro incentives and policies. Some
other models allow interaction between fundamentals and beliefs so that a crisis is triggered by
both factors working together not by any one in isolation (Ali, 2007). The third-generation
model emphasizes the balance-sheet effects associated with devaluations. The basic idea is
that banks and firms in emerging market countries have explicit currency mismatches on their
balance sheets because they borrow in foreign currency and lend in local currency. Banks and
firms face credit risk because their income is related to the production of non-traded goods
whose price, evaluated in foreign currency, falls after devaluations. Banks and firms are also
exposed to liquidity shocks because they finance long-term projects with short-term borrowing
(Craig, et al., 2007).

II.2.2. Financial Crisis under Islamic Economic Perspective
Under Islamic economic perspective, economic crisis could happen when the balance in
economic sector and its stakeholders are disrupted due to the transgressions of God»s law,
especially in the form of riba (interest), maysir (gambling and game of chance or speculation),
gharar (excessive uncertainty), price control, manipulation, asymmetric information, distributive
justice, fairness, greed, maslahah, etc. in their many forms. Financial sector is a part of economy
that supports real sector so that economic activities (especially in production and trade) can run
and excel smoothly without any hindrance.
a. Financial Crisis in Previous Era
Financial crises were rarely happened in Islamic era during the time of the Prophet
Muhammad (peace and blessing be upon him), the Four Guided Caliphs, Umayyad Empires,
Abbasid Empires, and Ottoman Empires. Nonetheless, there have been a few episodes of financial
crises during those eras. The most notorious financial crisis was recorded by Al-Maqrizi (766845 H/1364-1442 M) in 14th century Egypt. The crisis was triggered by overly minted copper
currency called Fulus by the government of the time. The results were prices of commodities
hike to the level of what we called «hyper inflation». This financial crisis has been closely related
to the debasement of metallic currency that caused price increase.
Based on this and other events, Al-Maqrizi formulated the causes of the crisis as natural
and human error. Natural causes include natural disasters like earthquake, landslide, volcano,
typhoon, tornado, floods, tsunami, etc. that would make shortage in the supply of commodities,
and subsequently would cause price hike. Economic activities and transactions would be slowed
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or even halted, which would eventually lead to famine, plague, and death. Moreover, even after
the disaster has passed, prices could continue to increase due to previous production halt. As a
result, the prices of other products and services would also increase, including salaries and wages.
Human error causes of crisis include corruption and poor management, excessive tax,
and too much money in circulation. Note that at this time, there was no interest and no fiat
money. However, the most notable cause of crisis was excess money supply due to overly
minted metallic currency.
Al-Maqrizi went further to analyze the impact of the crisis to seven groups of society. The
first group is power holders or bureaucrats who receive higher nominal income. They are not
really affected by the crisis much although their real income and purchasing power drop
significantly. The second group is conglomerates or the haves who have high nominal income.
They are only affected by the crisis a little due to drop in their assets. The third group is middle
entrepreneurs or professionals who have middle to high income. They are almost not impacted
by the crisis since their salaries have also increase in line with the price increase. The fourth
group is farmers, which can be divided into two groups, i.e., farm owners and farm workers.
Farm owners are positively affected by the crisis since their assets increase in value. Farm workers
are highly impacted and suffered so much by the crisis since the increase of their income are
not in par with the price increase. The fifth group includes Fuqaha (academicians), teachers,
students and soldiers who have fixed income. This group is most impacted and suffered by the
crisis. The sixth group includes blue collars and servants, while the seventh group includes
unfortunates and beggars. These two groups, who have lowest income, are the most suffered
by the crisis, so that many of them starve to death.
Another example of financial crisis has happened during the Ottoman Empire in 1839 M.
At this time, paper money ≈al-Qa»imah∆ was issued as official currency. Later on, the government
printed more and more paper money to finance its spending, so that price of commodities
increased inevitably which lead to crisis. After 23 years of application, al-Qa»imah finally
suspended in 1862 M due to too much al-Qa»imah in circulation to recover from the crisis. The
solution taken by the government was right on the root cause of the crisis, so that crisis would
not be repeated again in the future.
b. Theories
Under Islamic economic perspective, financial crisis could happen when the balance in
financial sector and its stakeholders are disrupted due to the transgressions of Allah»s laws in
their many forms. Allah»s Laws (cardinal principles) in economic and finance can be summarized
as follows (Zabswari, 1984, modified).
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Sovereignty belongs to Allah (Al-Malikal Mulk) and He is the Absolute (Ash-Shamad). Owner
of all that exist (Al-Maalik) (QS Ali Imran [3]:26, QS Ibrahim [14]:2, QS Al-Mulk [67]:1);
Man is His viceroy on the earth but not the real owner (QS Al-Baqarah [2]:30, QS Faathir
[35]:39);
Worldly things that man possesses or acquires are Allah»s blessings, therefore his less fortunate
brothers have a due share in his brother»s wealth, such as the obligation of zakah;
Abstain from wasteful and luxurious living;
Wealth should not be accumulated;
Wealth should always remain in circulation;
Economic exploitation of every kind has been eliminated, such as riba and maysir;
Removal of grave disparities in the economic conditions of individuals, thus eliminating
class conflicts, by dividing one»s possessions after his death among his heirs;
Laying out certain compulsory and voluntary obligations on the individuals having substantial
means for the poor members of the community (zakah, infaq, shadaqah, waqf, etc.).
Meanwhile, Obaidullah (2005) lays out the details of Islamic financial system ethics to be
conformed as follows.
Freedom to contract, which means no contract is valid if it involves an element of coercion
for either of the parties;
Freedom from Riba (interest), which means there is no reward for time preference alone.
Reward, returns or benefits must always accompany liability or risk;
Freedom from Gharar (excessive uncertainty), which means contracting under conditions of
excessive uncertainty is not permissible;
Freedom from Al-Qimar (gambling) and Al-Maysir (speculation or unearned income), which
means Contracting under excessive uncertainty (gharar)is akin to gambling (al-qimar), and
uninformed speculation in its worst form is also akin to gambling (al-qimar). Islam explicitly
prohibits gains made from games of chance, which involve unearned income (al-maysir);
Freedom from price control and manipulation, which means prices are determined by forces
of demand and supply. There should be no interference in the price formation process even
by the regulators. It is a requirement that the forces of demand and supply should be
genuine and free from any artificial manipulation.
Entitlement to transact at fair prices, which means prices are an outcome of free play of
forces of demand and supply without any intervention or manipulation.
Entitlement to equal, adequate and accurate information, which means there should be no
asymmetric information, no concealment, and no informational disadvantage to either party;
Freedom from darar (detriment), which means there is no third party which is adversely
affected by a contract of two parties;
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Mutual cooperation and solidarity, which means every person should assist one another in
the doing of good and righteousness, and should not assist one another in sin and
transgression (QS Al-Maidah [5];2);

Maslahah Mursalah (unrestricted public interest), which means concerns about conformity
to norms of Islamic ethics dominate all other concerns. Individual interests should not
dominate or be above public interests.
Iqbal (undated) adds money as potential capital, which means money becomes actual capital
only when it joins hands with other resources to undertake a productive activity.

Riba (Interest)
Riba is the central tenet of the system, which literally means ≈an excess∆ and interpreted
as ≈any unjustifiable increase of capital whether in loans or sales∆. More precisely, any positive,
fixed, predetermined rate tied to the maturity and the amount of principal (i.e., guaranteed
regardless of the performance of the investment) is considered riba and is prohibited. The
general consensus among Islamic scholars is that riba covers not only usury but also the charging
of ≈interest∆ as widely practiced (Iqbal, undated).
Some scholars, like Bernard Lietaer and Tareq el-Diwany, have identified some negative
impacts of interest (Meera, 2004), namely: 1) Interest requires endless economic growth even
when actual standards of living remain constant; 2) Interest encourages competition among
participants in the economy; and 3) Interest concentrates wealth in the hands of small minority
by taxing the majority. Comprehensively, Meera (2004) describes the impact of conventional
monetary system that can cause banking crises, economic problems, and political turmoil because
money gets destroyed.

Riba System

Impede Ec.
Growth

Money Creation &
Concentration

Inflation
Real Sector
Contraction

Source: Sakti (2007)

Figure III.2
The Implication of Interest in the Economy

In conventional economy, interest (riba) system, fiat money, fractional reserve banking
system, money as commodity, and the permissibility of speculation cause the creation of money
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol12/iss1/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v12i1

42

Ascarya: LESSONS LEARNED FROM REPEATED FINANCIAL CRISES: AN ISLAMIC ECONOM
Lessons Learned from Repeated Financial Crises: an Islamic Economic Perspective

39

(paper money and bank money) and concentration of money in monetary sector to seek higher
return with less or no risk. Consequently, money or investment that should be channeled to the
real sector for productive purposes mostly flows to the monetary sector and impedes growth,
and even reduces the size of real sector. The creation of money without value addition will
cause inflation. In the end, the goal of economic growth will be impeded (read figure III.2).
The alternative of interest system in Islamic economic and finance is profit-and-lost sharing
(PLS) system. The zakah system, PLS system and the prohibition of speculation will accelerate
investment activities to the real sector for productive purposes. This will ensure the distribution
of wealth and income as well as the growth in the real sector. The improvement in productivity
and opportunity to work and to do business finally will accelerate economic growth, and
therefore, social wellbeing will be achieved (read figure III.3).

PLS Investment

Accelerate Ec.
Growth

Wealth & Income
Distribution

Productivity &
Opportunity

Real Sector Grow
Source: Sakti (2007)

Figure III.3
The Implication of PLS in the Economy

In modern era, riba is not only present in interest, but also present in many other
sophisticated forms, such as fiat money, fractional reserve banking, credit card, derivatives, etc.
- Fiat Money
Fiat money is something (usually in the form of paper or coin) that is acknowledged as a
legal medium of exchange in a certain jurisdiction or state, even though it does not carry a
value or back up equivalent to its nominal value. The issuance of fiat money creates a new
purchasing power out of nothing. Therefore, fiat money gives unfair benefit, usually known as

seigniorage, to the money issuer authority. The creation of benefits without any counter value
(«iwad) in terms of ownership risk (ghurmi), value added (ikhtiyar), or liability (daman) are
categorized as riba by Ibnu Arabi.
Within economic system where fiat money is used, the institution given the authority to
issue money (usually central bank, monetary authority, treasury department, or other appointed
institution) gains this seigniorage benefit. Consequently, aggregate purchasing power of money
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will decrease (in the form of inflation) equivalent to the percentage of new money added
(issued) in the economy. The party who suffer a loss is the whole population who holds this
money. For example, if the cost of printing Rp100,000 bill is Rp2,000, then the seigniorage
benefit is Rp98,000.
Meanwhile, money in Islam is either full bodied money (money, in the form of gold or
silver, which has intrinsic value equivalent to its nominal value) or fully backed money (money,
usually in the form of paper or coin, which its nominal value is backed by 100 percent gold
equivalent stored by the issuing authority. In this new money issuance, there is no new purchasing
power created (no seigniorage), so that there is no riba involved. Furthermore, in the printing
process of new money, the cost of printing is the government responsibility, so that there is no
party suffers financial loss.
In the Islamic economic system where Islamic money is used, the institution given the
authority to issue money does not gain seigniorage benefit; even it has to take the responsibility
of printing costs. The amount of money added (issued) to the economy is aligned with the
growth of value added of the economy, so that Islamic economic in general does not have
inflationary nature and tends to be stable. Therefore, the value of dinar (in gold) and dirham (in
silver) have always been relatively stable. For example, the price of sheep has always been
around 1-2 dinar, and the price of chicken has always been around one dirham. With this kind
of money people do not have to suffer the loss due to a decrease of purchasing power (inflation)
like that of fiat money.
The use of fiat money will only benefits big and developed countries, like United States
with its dollars and European Union with its Euros, where their currencies are used widely all
over the world. With their fiat money, they can suck the wealth of other small and less developed
countries that have abundance natural resources and exchange them with paper which has no
intrinsic value. For example, with only US$1 expenses to print US$100 bill, the seigniorage
profit earned by the US from the use of its currency by the world community would be enormous.
Whereas, the use of Islamic money would make fair transactions, and all countries are in the
same rank. Moreover, Mahmud Abu Saud in his book ≈Interest Free Banking∆ (1976) stated
that unless we standardized our money and stabilized its value, the sound and healthy economy
could not be achieved. Only with the gold (dinar) and silver (dirham) standards that money can
be stabilized.
- Fractional Reserve Banking
Fractional reserve banking system means that a bank is required to hold reserve in only a
certain percentage of deposits mobilized. The minimum reserve requirement of bank varies
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol12/iss1/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v12i1

44

Ascarya: LESSONS LEARNED FROM REPEATED FINANCIAL CRISES: AN ISLAMIC ECONOM
Lessons Learned from Repeated Financial Crises: an Islamic Economic Perspective

41

around 5% - 20%. With this system, bank has the ability to create another kind of fiat money,
i.e. bank money (demand deposits, electronic money), through multiple deposit creation. In
this case, money is created when a bank extends loan. For example, if the required minimum
reserve is 10%, Rp1 million deposit, first, will be recorded as «Deposit» in liability side and cash
«Reserve» in asset side. Second, since reserve requirement is only 10%, the bank can extend
loan as much as Rp9 million, so that the total deposit becomes Rp10 million. This transaction
illustrated below.

Balance Sheet 1
Reserve

1 mn

Deposit

1 mn

Balance Sheet 2
Reserve
Loan

1 mn
9 mn

Deposit
Deposit (loan)

1 mn
9 mn

The formula of multiple deposit creation can be written as follows (Meera, 2004):
D = 1/r x R,
Where, D = change in total deposit; r = minimum reserve ratio (e.g., 10%); and R= change in
reserve (e.g., new deposit Rp1 million). In this example, deposit of Rp1 million can create new
money (deposit) nine times of its original value, Rp9 million, so that the total deposit becomes
Rp10 million. Therefore, fractional reserve banking system also gives unfair seigniorage profit
to the bank which authorized to create new bank money. Remember that the creation of profit
without any counter value is considered as riba by Ibnu Arabi. Consequently, the creation of
bank money will also make the aggregate purchasing power of money to decrease (in the form
of inflation) equivalent to the percentage of new bank money created by bank. The party who
suffer a loss with the creation of new bank money is, again, the whole population who holds
this money.
Meanwhile, the 100 percent reserve banking system does not give the opportunity for
bank to create new (bank) money, since 100 percent reserve has to be deposited back to
central bank. A bank can only extend loan as much as the original deposit. Therefore, there will
be no new purchasing power created (and no seigniorage), so that there is no riba involved,
there is no inflationary effect, and there is no party suffered any loss.
For example, Rp1 million deposits, first, will be recorded as «Deposit» in liability side and
cash «Reserve» in asset side. Second, since reserve requirement is 100%, the bank can only
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extend loan as much as Rp1 million, so that in the asset side, the «Reserve∆ becomes «Loan» of
Rp1 million. This transaction can be illustrated below.

Balance Sheet 1
Reserve

1 mn

Deposit

1 mn

Balance Sheet 2
Loan

1 mn

Deposit

1 mn

Maysir (game of chance or speculation)
The Qurannprohibits contracting under conditions of uncertainty and gambling (qimar).
The two words, uncertainty and gambling are not synonymous, though related. Uncertainty is
same as gharar and under such conditions, exchange or contracting is reduced to a gamble. It
is interesting to note here that a major objection of contemporary scholars against forwards,
futures and options contracts is that these are almost always settled in price differences only.
Hence, these are used more as tools of gambling than as tools of risk management (Obaidullah,
2005).
Gambling is prohibited not only because it is a game of chance with irrational speculation
and baseless. It is also prohibited because it does not give productive impact to the economy,
so that it does not increase aggregate supply of products and services in the real sector. This
prohibition is similar to the prohibition of hoarding commodities that will reduce aggregate
supply. Therefore, the prohibition of maysir economically implies that investment activities should
correlate to the real sector to increase aggregate supply.
In modern era, maysir is not only present in gambling, but also present in many other
sophisticated forms, such as stocks/financial assets trading to make capital gain, forwards,
future and options contracts, derivatives products (such as Credit Default Swaps), etc.

II.3. Previous Studies under Conventional Economic Perspective
There are so many papers that discuss financial crisis under conventional perspective,
especially after the occurrence of crisis, locally, regionally or globally. Conventional literature
that discusses chronology of crisis since the Great Depression is written by Davies and Davies
(1996), while the newest database on financial crisis in the period of 1970-2007 is written by
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Laeven and Valencia (2008), which includes 395 episodes of financial crises (banking crisis,
currency crisis and sovereign debt crisis), including 42 twin crises and 10 triple crises. Literatures
that discuss Asian financial crisis are plenty, such as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Lindgren et

al. (1999), McKibbin and Martin (1999), Dooley (2000), Barro (2001), Kawai et al. (2001),
Caprio and Klingebiel (2002), Allayannis et al. (2003), Kaminsky et al. (2003), Claessens et al.
(2004), Eichengreen (2004), Hanson (2005), Goldstein (2005), Caprio (2005), and Caprio et al.
(2005). There are also several literatures that discuss financial crisis in Indonesia, such as Kenward
(2002) and Batunanggar (2002). Moreover, literatures that discuss current global financial crisis
triggered by subprime mortgage crisis in the US has also been written by many authors, such as
Caprio et al. (2008), Chailloux et al. (2008), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Other than those,
conventional discussion of the crisis that offers new paradigm is proposed by Lietaer et al.
(2008).
Table III.1
Summary of Important Financial Crises
Year of
Crisis

Type of Crisis

NPL
(%)

Cost
(% GDP)

Loss
(% GDP)

Growth
Min (%)

Argentina

2001

Syst. Banking, Debt, Currency

20.1

9.6

42.7

-10.9

Bolivia

1994

Syst. Banking

6.2

6.0

0.0

4.4

Brazil

1994

Syst. Banking, Debt R.

16.0

13.2

0.0

2.1

Chile

1981

Syst. Banking, Currency, Debt

35.6

42.9

92.4

-13.6

Colombia

1998

Syst. Banking

4.1

5.0

15.1

0.9

Dominican Rep.

2003

Syst. Banking, Currency, Debt

9.0

22.0

15.5

-1.9

Ecuador

1998

Syst. Banking, Currency, Debt

40.0

21.7

6.5

-6.3

Mexico

1994

Syst. Banking, Currency

18.9

19.3

4.2

-6.2

Nicaragua

2000

Syst. Banking

12.7

13.6

0.0

0.8

Paraguay

1995

Syst. Banking

8.1

12.9

0.0

0.4

Uruguay

2002

Syst. Banking, Currency, Debt

36.3

20.0

28.8

-11.0

Venezuela

1994

Syst. Banking, Currency

24.0

15.0

9.6

-2.3

Indonesia

1997

Syst. Banking, Currency, Debt

32.5

56.8

67.9

-13.1

Korea

1997

Syst. Banking, Currency

35.0

31.2

50.1

-6.9

Malaysia

1997

Syst. Banking, Currency

30.0

16.4

50.0

-7.4

Philippines

1997

Syst. Banking, Currency

20.0

13.2

0.0

-0.6

Thailand

1997

Syst. Banking, Currency

33.0

43.8

97.7

-10.5

Vietnam

1997

Syst. Banking, Debt R.

35.0

10.0

19.7

4.8

Country
South America:

Asia:

Others:
China

1998

Syst. Banking

20.0

18.0

36.8

7.6

Japan

1997

Syst. Banking

35.0

14.0

17.6

-2.0

Russia

1998

Syst. Banking, Currency, Debt

40.0

6.0

0.0

-5.3

Turkey

2000

Syst. Banking, Currency

27.6

32.0

5.4

-5.7

Ukraine

1998

Syst. Banking, Currency, Debt

62.4

0.0

0.0

-1.9

Source: Laeven dan Valencia (2008)
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Summary on important crises of South America, Asia, and other countries can be read in
table III.1. In general, triple crises are more severe than twin crises or single crisis. It is recorded
that triple crises of Chile in 1981 has caused the most output loss. Meanwhile, Ukraine is a
country that managed to minimize the loss of triple crises in 1998. Moreover, countries that
never hit by the crisis include Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Brunei,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Luxemburg, Mauritius, Netherlands, Singapore,
dan Switzerland.
Meanwhile, the ongoing global financial crisis, started from US subprime mortgage
crisis in August 2007 which has spread out to more than 25 countries in various parts o the
globe since September 2008, is basically similar to previous financial crises (Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2008). At this time of crisis, countries that have never been hit by financial crisis are
unable to avoid the contagion, such as the Netherland, France, Germany, and Singapore.
According to Caprio et al. (2008), the principal source of the crisis has been the
contradictory political and bureaucratic incentives which undermine the effectiveness of
financial regulation and supervision in every country in the world. One of them is financial
instrument innovations that lead to more complicated risk shifting behavior, yet less
transparent. In fact, there are lessons learned from repeated previous crises. However, they
fail to learn from past mistakes. Azis (2008) argues that the root causes of the crisis are
global imbalances in current account, investment-savings and export-import. Capital inflow
in surplus countries causes asset price bubble which inevitably results in systemic banking
crisis.
The current measures to cope with the crisis are still limited to crisis containment and
fundamentally have not changed much, such as: a) inject liquidity or bailout; b) lower interest
rates; c) fiscal expansion; d) establish asset management institution to buy toxic assets; e)
buy share of good asset with cash or securities paper; f) take over ownership and
nationalization; g) guarantee interbank loans; h) blanket guarantee or increase deposit
insurance; i) temporarily close the bourse; j) prohibit short-selling; k) rely on domestic demand;
l) offer incentive to exporter (Azis, 2008; Chailloux et al., 2008; Depkominfo, 2008). Whereas,
the program reform to end the crisis are proposed by Caprio et al. (2008): 1) lender reform,
where compensation for loan officers must be linked to long-term performance rather than
to short-term profits; 2) Credit Rating Organization (CRO) Reform, that incorporates its agency
and accountability; 3) Securitization Reform; 4) Accounting Reform; 5) Improve Government
Accountability; 6) Basel II revision to new Basel III since risk management has changed so
much.
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In the mean time, Lietaer et al. (2008) observe the on-going global financial crisis
results not from a cyclical or managerial failure, but from a structural one, especially in money
and monetary systems. Part of the evidence is repeated financial crises since the breakdown
of Bretton Woods agreement with increasing frequency as well as magnitude, and such
crashes have happened even under very different regulatory systems as well as at different
stages of economic development. Laeven dan Valencia (2008) have recorder 395 crises during
1970-2007, including 42 twin crises and 10 triple crises. However, so far the conventional
solutions being applied only deal with the symptoms, not the systemic cause, such as bailout,
nationalization etc. Similarly, the financial reregulation that will be on everybody»s political
agenda will, at best, reduce the frequency of such crises, but not avoid their re-occurrence.
Their recommendation is the implementation of complementary currency as partial payment
of taxes and business-to-business (B2B) which runs in parallel with national currency to increase
the availability of money in its prime function as a medium of exchange, rather than for
savings or speculation. Additionally, these currencies are expressly designed to link what
would remain otherwise unused resources with unmet needs within a community, region or
country.

II.4. Previous Studies under Islamic Economic Perspective
On the other hand, literatures of financial crisis under Islamic perspective are not as many
as that of conventional perspective. Some literatures on Asian financial crisis include Hasan
(2002) and Hasan (2003) that discuss financial crisis in Malaysia,£as well as Garcia et al. (2004)
that discusses financial crisis in Asia. Meanwhile, Al-Jarhi (2004) analyses banking crisis in Turkey,
while Ali (2007) discusses banking crisis in general. Moreover, literatures that discuss current
global financial are limited, such as study by Siddiqi (2008). However, literatures in the form of
article and short paper are many, such as Harahap (2008), Idris (2008), Iqbal (2008), Izhar
(2008), Sakti (2008), Sanrego and Ali (2008), Thomas (2008), and Shodiq (2008).
Summary of literatures on the root causes of financial crises and their alternative
solutions under Islamic economic perspective can be read in table III.2. It can be concluded
from Islamic economic literatures that the root causes of financial crises are human error
and natural phenomenon uncontrollable by human. Human error can be divided into three
groups, namely (1) moral decadences that trigger (2) system or conceptual flaws and (3)
internal weaknesses.
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Table III.2
Root Causes of Financial Crises And Alternative Solutions
Author

Root Causes

Hasan (2002, 2003)

Interest System
Speculation
Fractional Reserve Banking
Fiat Monetary System
Fractional Reserve Banking
Interest-Based Credit
Fractional Reserve Banking
Interest-Based Credit
Debt-Based Finance
Weak Internal Mgt
Imprudent Financing
Poor Crisis Mgt
Small Size
Incompetence BODs, Staffs
Dual Banking System
Liquidity Access
Conv. Bank Products Imitation
Macroeconomic factors
Ext. Microeconomic factors
Int. Microeconomic factors
Moral failure (Greed, Hedonism)
Interest System
Speculation
Risk Shifting
Money Creation

Garcia et al. (2004)
Al-Jarhi (2004)
Ali (2006/2007)

Ali (2007)

Siddiqi (2008)

Root Causes
Author

Root Causes

Interest-Free System
Restricted
Narrow Banking + Liquidity
Gold Monetary System
Narrow Banking
Equity-Based Financing
Narrow Banking
Commodity and PLS Finances
Equity-Based Finance

Crisis Mgt Plan
Create Association of Islamic Bank
Competence BODs, Staffs
Stability of both banks are required
Easy Access to Liquidity
IB should not imitate CB products

Interest-free System
Restricted
Risk Sharing
Restricted

Note: Narrow Banking = 100 Percent Reserve (for demand deposits) Banking System. Macroeconomic factors include all macro situations. External
microeconomic factors include supervision problems, inadequate infrastructure, financial liberalization policies, political interference, moral hazard due
to deposit insurance, lack of transparency, fraud and corruption. Internal microeconomic factors include banking strategy, poor credit assessment, taking
interest rate or exchange rate exposure, concentration of lending, entering in new areas of activity, internal control failure, other operational failures.

III. ROOT CAUSES OF FINANCIAL CRISES
Based on literature review in chapter II, recipes to cure financial crises usually only touch
the symptoms and never touch their real systemic root causes, so that we never really get rid of
the crises. Therefore, the grand strategy to be taken to cure the crises should be gradually
removing their systemic root causes, as can be read in figure III.4. This study will focus on
system or conceptual flaws.
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Figure III.4
The Anatomy of Financial Crises

Economic system flaws can be categorized into five groups, namely 1) excess money
supply; 2) speculation; 3) interest system; 4) international monetary system; and 5) decoupling
of real and monetary sectors. These five system flaws have led crisis to re-emerge repeatedly,
since most economists presume that these systems are not the root causes of the crises, so that
solutions never address these issues.
1. Excess Money Supply
Excess money supply is a result of excess money creation and the creation of artificial
purchasing power. Excess money creation includes the printing of fiat money (seigniorage) and
the creation of bank money through fractional reserve banking (money multiplier), while the
creation of artificial purchasing power includes credit card and credit line. Furthermore, money
creation also takes place in financial market with multi level derivatives products. Excess money
supply has proven to be the primary determinant of inflation in most countries, including
Indonesia (Ascarya, 2008).
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Fractional reserve banking system can really create new money several fold (money
multiplier) without backup assets. For example, Lehman Brothers» and Goldman Sachs» ratio of
assets to capital were respectively 30 and 26, before they both disappeared. Some European
banks had even a higher leverage: BNP Parisbas at 32; Dexia and Barclays» leverage ratios are
both estimated at about 40; UBS» at 47; and Deutsche Bank»s a whopping 83 (Lietaer et al.,
2008). Meanwhile, long before that in 1937, Lord Josiah Stamp, former director Bank of England,
described the power of a bank with interest as a weapon (Sakti, 2007).
≈The modern banking system manufactures money out of nothing. The process is perhaps

the most astounding piece of sleight of hand that was ever invented. Banking was
coinceived in inequity and born in sin. Bankers own the earth; take it away from them,
but leave them with the power to create credit, and with the stroke of a pen they will
create enough money to buy it back again. If you want to be slaves of the bankers, and
pay the cost of your own slavery, then let the banks create money.∆ 3
Credit card essentially is an instant creator of purchasing power for the card holder,
which actually does not have the purchasing power yet. The ease to obtain credit card (one
person can obtain several credit cards at once) leads to a huge outstanding credit card loan in
almost every country. Non-performing credit card loans are expected to be a new threat to
countries suffering from financial crises, especially the United States.
Derivatives products are the creator of new money in financial market which are illustrated
as the inverted pyramid of debts, standing on a slender base of real wealth, where small original/
back up asset at the bottom has grown several fold as derivatives products at the top, so that
their collapse are inevitable. The failure of subprime mortgage in the United States is a clear
example.
2. Speculation
Today»s capitalistic economic system relies heavily on the psychology of speculators,
especially in financial market, since this system allows products and transactions which encourage
speculation. This limitation is never considered as fundamental flaw, so that there is never a
policy to curb speculative activity.
Speculative activity essentially is a zero-sum game which encourages risk shifting behavior
that cannot produce real value added. This is different from risk sharing in investment activity
which can produce real value added. Speculation activities in capital and money markets take
place when capital owner expects instant return from capital gain, short-selling, misuse hedging,

3 Lord J. Stamp, Public Address in Central Hall, Westminster, 1937.
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derivatives etc. Since these are zero-sum game (you lose what I gain), there is no added value in
the economy, unlike trade or investment activities based on risk sharing.
Capital market is a place where investors (surplus spending units) meet entrepreneurs
(deficit spending units). However, rule and regulation make investment and speculative activities
can be done, making it difficult to differentiate between real investor and speculator. Pessimistic
estimate states that 95 percent of investors are actually speculators. Advanced products and
transactions innovations encourage speculative and risk shifting behaviors.
3. Interest System
Interest system is one of the root causes of financial crises. The fixed and predetermine
rate of interest (rate of return) before economic activity is started will dictate the market
and lead to mislead market behavior from its natural course. Interest rate should reflect
productivity level of the capital in economic process. However, that never happens, so that
there is always a gap between predetermined interest rate and actual productivity that
leads to market distortion. Interest system is a systematic risk shifting so that there is always
unfairness involved. When all market players do not want to share the risk (which is naturally
embedded in every business and its return), somehow, someone will become a victim of the
system. In the mean time, credit system has dictated the market to behave unnaturally. The
predetermination of interest rate is basically provides guaranteed profit for one party against
unpredictable future events. Predetermined interest rate (whether it is high or low) will
force the market to give positive return (above the cost of fund), while real productivity
could be higher or lower than the cost of fund, so that the business may gain profits or
suffer losses. When there exists this gap, the market will react negatively (Sakti, 2008).
Moreover, different from general conventional economic views, it has been proven that
interest rate is one of the major determinants of inflation in Indonesia (Ascarya, 2009).
Guarantee
Since long ago, some western economists have criticized interest system with its credit
mechanism that has caused debt trap problems for many developing and developed countries.
Consequently, there is always a bubble in economic growth realized and it never reflects the
real productivity and wellbeing. This bubble economy is like a time bomb that will explode at
some point in the future in the form of crisis. Barbeton and Lane (1999) in Sakti (2007) have
been predicted the occurrence of the crises that will afflict developed countries.

≈The credit and capital markets have grown too rapidly, with too little transparency and
accountability. Prepare for an explosion that will rock the western financial sistem to its
foundations.∆
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Furthermore, interest system has actually been prohibited since long before in Jewish
teachings (Exodus 22:25, Deuteronomy 23: 19, Levicitus 35:7, Lucas 6: 35), Christian
teachings (Lucas 6:34-35, the early priests» views of«I-XII decades, the Christian scholars»
views of XII-XV decades, the Christian reformists» views of XVI-1836) as well as Greek
teachings delivered by Plato (427-347 SM) and Aristoteles (384-322 SM). Finally, interest
system (riba or usury) is prohibited in Islamic teaching through Al-Qur»an in stages, started
in QS Ar-Rum [30]:39, QS An-Nisaa [4]:161, QS Ali Imran [3]:130-132 and QS Al-Baqarah
[2]:275-279 (Ascarya, 2007).
4. International Monetary System
Current international monetary system is based on multiple fiat money of every country
in the world with floating value and without any back-up of real assets. Therefore, each
country gains seigniorage profits of printing the national currency on the burden of all people
as money holders in the form of depleting purchasing power (or inflation). Country like the
United States gains a huge seigniorage, since its currency is used internationally. This condition
makes persistent inflation and unfairness, especially for small countries with un-convertible
currency. The more a currency is used as international payment, the more a country gains
seigniorage. In contrast, a country with un-convertible currency (developing countries, small
countries and poor countries) can only enjoy seigniorage in national level. Meanwhile, money
creation through banking system has made the 20th century one of the highest inflationary
centuries on the historical record, inflation is obviously not a problem specific to the process of
money issuance by governments (Lietaer et al., 2008). Moreover, exchange rate has proven to
be one of major determinants of inflation in several countries, including Indonesia (Yanuarti
and Hutabarat, 2006; Ascarya, 2009).
The value of a currency is relatively stable when it is backed by gold. But, when a currency
has no more back up from gold, its value depreciates quickly. A research conducted by Prof.
Roy Festrem of Berkeley University concluded that in the span of 400 years up to 1976 the price
and value of gold has been relatively stable, even has slightly been appreciated (Sanrego and
Ali, 2008). In 1800, the price of gold was equivalent to 19.39 US Dollar per troy ounce, while
before the breakdown of Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971, the price of gold was equivalent
to 35 US Dollar per troy ounce. But in 2004, the price of gold has jumped to 455.75 US Dollar
per troy ounce, and at the end of 2008 it has jumped again to 769.40 US Dollar per troy ounce.
This means that the value of US Dollar has been stable in a long period of time when it was
backed by gold, but it has been depreciated quickly when it was not backed by gold. This
condition applies to other fiat moneys.
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5. Decoupling of Real and Monetary Sectors
In the history of economy, the main entity of economy has always been the productive
activities of goods and services in the real sector with money served as medium of exchange.
The emergence and expansion of interest system with money as a commodity and rate of
interest as its price, new financial markets emerged in parallel with the main market of goods
and services in the real sector, such as capital market, money market, bond market and derivatives
market. Since financial markets offer fixed and predetermined rate of return, money/capital
that originally is invested in the real sector, flows swiftly to financial sector (which cannot
produce real value added), so that the amount of capital concentrated in financial sector has
exceed tens of times to that in the real sector (which can produce real value added). Financial
sector, which is originally serves as supporting entity to the real sector, has developed as a
separate sector that has its own products and prices. Therefore, Sakti (2007) argues that the
economy is inevitably dichotomized (consciously or unconsciously) into two main activities,
namely real activity and monetary activity (also known as classical dichotomy).4 The consequent
of this misallocation of resources has made lack of capital to grow in the real sector, while it has
made financial sector artificially grow with flooded capital in the form of bubble economy,
which eventually will be corrected and burst in the form of financial crisis. Furthermore, the
dichotomy will increase the gap between the rich and the poor.
The believe that financial sector is a standalone sector in the economy may be wrong,
since the dichotomy has resulted in a big gap between real and financial sectors. Financial
sector should function as a supporting agent to economic growth through real sector activities.
Consequently, all elements and instruments in the financial sector should be maintained and
protected to fully support real sector activities. Therefore, the tendency of repeated bubble in
the financial sector could be avoided.

IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
This chapter will present some empirical evidences of the main root causes of financial
crises in Indonesia. The three main root causes are interest, excess money, and exchange rate,
while the three alternative substitutes are PLS return (as a substitute for interest), just money
(as a substitute for excess money), and single global currency or gold (as a substitute for multiple
currency or exchange rate), as presented in figure III.5.

4 This condition is augmented by monetary theories of classical thought, which essentially states that the monetary policy to control
money supply will not affect the real sector. The expansion of money supply will only increase the price, while output will not
increase.
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Figure III.5
Substitutions of Conventional Systems with Islamic Systems

IV.1. Type and Source of Data
The data used in this study is secondary data of monthly time series obtained from
Indonesian Economic and Finance Statistics of Bank Indonesia (SEKI-BI), Syariah Banking Statistics
of Bank Indonesia (SPS-BI), for the period of January 2002 to November 2008.

IV.2. Variable and Operational Definition
The variables used in this study and their operational definitions are as follows.
INF
a. CPI Inflation (INF
INF) is the index of monthly CPI inflation obtained from SEKI-BI.
b. Excess money supply from money and credit creation or fiat money (FM
FM) is the monthly
FM
M2 - consumption data obtained from SEKI-BI.
IR) is the monthly 1-month working capital loan rate of conventional banks
c. Interest rate (IR
IR
obtained from SEKI-BI.
EXC
d. Multiple currencies system or exchange rate (EXC
EXC) is the nominal Rupiah exchange rate to
the US Dollar obtained from SEKI-BI.
e. Just money supply or money needed in the economy in Islamic perspective (JM
JM) is an
JM
equilibrium intrinsic M0 proximate by the monthly consumption data obtained from
SEKI-BI.
f. PLS Returns (RS
RS) is the returns of investment from Islamic bank represented by equivalent
RS

rate from the actual returns of Mudharabah time deposit or investment obtained from fullfledged Islamic banks and Syariah Banking Statistics of Bank Indonesia (SPS-BI).
GOLD
g. Single global currency or gold price (GOLD
GOLD) is international gold price index obtained from
Indeks Harga Energi SEKI-BI.
In this model, only the main root causes of financial crises are included. Conventional
model will include excess money supply from money and credit creation (FM), interest rate (IR),
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol12/iss1/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v12i1

56

Ascarya: LESSONS LEARNED FROM REPEATED FINANCIAL CRISES: AN ISLAMIC ECONOM
Lessons Learned from Repeated Financial Crises: an Islamic Economic Perspective

53

and multiple currency system or exchange rate (EXC). Meanwhile, Islamic model will replace
excess money supply (FM) with just money supply (IM), interest rate (IR) with PLS returns (RS),
and exchange rate (EXC) with single global currency (GOLD).
The drawback of this model is that not all variables (root causes of financial crises) are
included in the model. Another drawback of this model is that the replacement variables for
Islamic model (i.e. JM, RS, and GOLD) are not immune from the contamination of conventional
model, since JM and GOLD are conventional data to be used as proxies, while RS is still dominated
and influenced by interest rate, since the share of Islamic banking in Indonesia is still very small
at 2.2%. Moreover, the essence/quality of true JM and FM (intrinsic M0 vs. token M0), where
JM is not created from nothing while FM is created from nothing, is not captured by their
proxies, M0 and consumption, respectively.

IV.3. Method of Estimation
The empirical exercise can be done using Vector Auto Regression (VAR), followed by
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), if cointegration occurred. VAR is an n-equation with nendogenous variable, where each variable is explained by its own lag, as well as current and
past values of other endogenous variables in the model. Therefore, in the context of modern
econometrics, VAR is considered as multivariate time series that treats all variables endogenous,
since there is no confidence that a variable is actually exogenous, and VAR allows the data to
tell what actually happen. Sims (1980) argue that if there is true simultaneity among a set of
variables, they should all be treated on an equal footing and there should not be any a priori
distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables. Enders (2004) formulates a simple
first-order bivariate primitive system that can be written as follows.
(III.1)
(III.2)
With assumptions that both yt and zt are stationary, εyt and εzt are white noise disturbances
with standard deviations of σy and σz, respectively, and εyt and εzt are uncorrelated white-noise
disturbances. Meanwhile, the standard form of the above primitive form can be written as follows.
(III.3)
(III.4)
Where, eyt and ezt are composites of εyt and εzt. The primitive form is called structural VAR,
while the standard form is called VAR. The detailed transformation from primitive form to
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standard form can be read in Enders (2004). In short, according to Achsani et al., 2005, the
general VAR model mathematically can be represented as follows.
(III.5)
Where xt is a vector of endogenous variables with (n x 1) dimension, µt is a vector of exogenous
variables, including constant (intercept) and trend, Ai is coefficient matrix with (n x n) dimension,
and εt is a vector of residuals. In a simple bivariate system yt and zt, yt is affected by current and
past value of zt, while zt is affected by current and past value of yt.
VAR provides systematic ways to capture dynamic changes in multiple time series, and
possess credible and easy to understand approach for describing data, forecasting, structural
inference, and policy analysis (Stock and Watson, 2001). VAR provides four tools of analysis,
namely, forecasting, impulse response function (IRF), forecast error variance decomposition
(FEVD) and Granger causality test. Forecasting can be used to extrapolate current and future
values of all variables by utilizing all past information of the variables. IRF can be used to trace
current and future responses of each variable to the shock of certain variable. FEVD can be
used to predict the contribution of each variable to the shock or changes of certain variable.
Meanwhile, Granger causality can be used to determine the causal relationship among variables.
Like any other econometric models, VAR also comprises a series of process of model
specification and identification. Model specification includes the selection of variables and their
lag length to be used in the model. While, model identification is to identify the equation
before it can be used for estimation. There are several possible conditions encountered in the
identification process. Overidentified condition will be obtained if the number of information
exceeds the number of parameter to be estimated. Exactly identified or just identified condition
will be obtained if the number of information and the number of parameter to be estimated is
equal. Meanwhile, underidentified condition will be obtained if the number of information is
less than the number of parameter to be estimated. Estimation process can only be carried out
under overidentified and exactly identified or just identified conditions.
The advantages of VAR method compared to other econometric methods, among others,
are (Gujarati, 2004, modified): 1) VAR method is freed from various economic theory restrictions
that often exists, such as spurious variable endogeneity and exogeneity; 2) VAR develops model
simultaneously within complex multivariate system, so that it can capture all relationships among
variables in the equation; 3) Multivariate VAR test can avoid biased parameters due to exclusion
of relevant variables; 4) VAR test can detect the relationships among variables within equation
system by treating all variables endogenous; 5) VAR method is simple where one does not have
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to worry about determining which variables are endogenous and which ones exogenous, since
VAR treats all variables endogenous; 6) VAR estimation is simple where the usual OLS method
can be applied to each equation separately; and 7) The estimate forecasts obtained are in many
cases better than those obtained from other more complex simultaneous-equation models.
Meanwhile, the disadvantages and problems of VAR model, according to Gujarati (2004),
are: 1) VAR model is a-theoretic, since it uses less prior information, unlike simultaneous-equation
model where exclusion and inclusion of certain variables plays a crucial role in the identification
of the model; 2) VAR model is less suited for policy analysis, due to its emphasis on forecasting;
3) Choosing the appropriate lag length is the biggest practical challenge in VAR modelling,
especially when there are too many variables with long lag-lenght, so that there will be too
many parameters that will consume a lot of degree of freedom and require a large sample size;
4) All variables should be (jointly) stationary. If not, all data should be transformed appropriately,
e.g. by first-differencing. Long-term relationships will be lost in the transformation of data level
needed in the analysis; and 5) Impulse Response function (IRF) is the centerpiece of VAR analysis,
which has been questioned by researchers.
To overcome the drawback of first difference VAR and to regain the long-term relationships
among variables, vector error correction model (VECM) can be applied, provided that there are
cointegrations among variables. The trick is to reincorporate original equation in level into the
new equation as follows.
(III.6)
(III.7)
Where a is long-term regression coefficient, b is short-term regression coefficient, λ is an error
correction parameter, and the frase in the bracket shows the cointegration between variables y
and z. The general VECM model mathematically can be represented as follows (Achsani et al,
2005).
(III.8)
Where, Π and Γ are functions of Ai. The matrix Π can be decomposed into two matrices λ dan

β with (n x r) dimension. Π = λβT, where λ is called an adjustment matrix and β is a cointegration
vector. Moreover, r is a cointegration rank.
The process of VAR analysis can be read in figure III.6. After the raw data is ready, data is
transformed into natural logarithmic (ln) form, except for interest rate and PLS returns data, to
get consistent and valid results. The first test to be conducted is unit root test. If the data is
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stationary at level, then VAR can be done in level. VAR level can estimate long-term relationship
between variables. If not, the data should be differentiated. If the data is stationary at first
difference, then it should be checked for the existence of cointegration between variables. If
the data is not cointegrated, then VAR can be done in first difference, and it can only estimate
short-term relationship between variables. Innovation accounting will not be meaningful for
long-term relationship. If the data is cointegrated, then VECM can be done using data in level
to incorporate long-term relationship between variables. VECM can estimate short-term and
long-term relationship between variables. Innovation accounting for VAR level and VECM will
be meaningful for long-term relationship.
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Figure III.6
The Process of VAR Analysis

Based on the conceptual framework in figure III.5, the main root causes of financial crises
are: 1) fiat money «FM» excess money supply from money and credit creations; 2) interest rate
«IR»; and 3) exchange rate «EXC». This model can be written as follows.
(III.9)
To eradicate some of the root causes of financial crises under Islamic perspective, excess
money supply will be no more and replaced by just money supply «JM», since fiat money is
replaced by gold backed money with no seigniorage, fractional reserve banking is replaced by
100 percent reserve banking or narrow banking that does not create bank money, credit card
is replaced by debit card so that there is no purchasing power creation, and derivatives are
replaced by asset backed securities and sukuk so that there is no leveraging. Moreover,
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international multiple currency system will be replaced by single global currency based on gold
standard «GOLD» so that there is no exchange rate inflation, while interest rate is replaced by
profit-and-loss sharing returns «RS» so that there is no credit creation. Therefore, the model of
alternative substitutes under Islamic perspective can be written as follows.
(III.10)
Following the model in equation (III.9), the equation of VAR model in matrix for
conventional CPI inflation can be written as follows.

(III.11)

↓

Variable

↓

↓

Constant

↓

Parameter

↓

Lag

Error

Following the model of alternative substitutes under Islamic perspective in equation (III.10),
the equation of VAR model in matrix can be written as follows.

(III.12)

Furthermore, if the data shows stationary in first difference and cointegration between
variables, then the VAR model will be combined with correction error model, namely Vector
Error Correction Model (VECM). Therefore, equation of the VECM model in matrix for the
model in equation (III.11) can be written as follows.

(III.13)

Equation of the VECM model in matrix for equation (III.12) can be written as follows.

(III.14)
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Where, ∆ is the change of variable from previous period, λ is an adjustment level from shortterm to long-term equilibrium.
To determine the inter-relation among variables under study, innovation accounting of
Impulse Response Function (IRF) and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) will be
utilized. IRF can be used to determine the response of one endogen variable from the shock of
other variables in the model. FEVD can be used to determine the relative contribution of one
variable to explain variability of its endogenous variables. All data in this study is transformed
into natural logarithmic form (ln), except interest rate, PLS returns, and expected inflation, to
obtain valid and consistent results. Software to be used in the data processing is Microsoft

Excel 2007 and Eviews 4.1.

IV.4. Results and Analysis
IV.4.1. Stationary Test
Two methods are used simultaneously to test the existence of unit root or the stationary of
the data, i.e., Augmented Dickey-Fuller or ADF test and Phillips-Perron or PP test with 5% McKinnon
critical value, meaning that if the value of t-ADF or t-PP is less than 5% McKinnon critical value,
then the data is stationary or has no unit root. Table appendix III.1 and table appendix III.2 in the
appendix show the results of stationary tests of conventional model and Islamic model, respectively.
There is no variable that stationary at level, however, all variables are stationary at first difference.

IV.4.2. Selection of Optimal Lag
One problem of the VAR system is autocorrelation. To overcome this problem, optimal
lag length should be applied. Therefore, optimal lag length should be obtained using the test
of optimal lag. The selection of optimal lag length in this study will be based on the shortest lag
of Schwarz Information Criterion (SC). Table appendix III.3 and table appendix III.4 in the appendix
show the results of optimal lag selection test for conventional model and Islamic model,
respectively. Based on SC, the optimal lag for original model is 2 (two) and the optimal lag for
alternative Islamic model is also 2 (two).

IV.4.3. Cointegration Test
All variables in original and alternative Islamic models are stationary at first difference,
I(1), so that the long-term relationships among variables can only be obtained if they have
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satisfied the criteria of integration process. Cointegration test based on trace statistics will be
applied to determine the number of equation systems that can explain long-term relationship.
Table III.5 and III.6 in the appendix show the results of cointegration test for original model and
alternative Islamic model, respectively. Trace test of original model indicates 1 (one) cointegrating
equations at the 5% critical value, while trace test of alternative Islamic model also indicates 1
(one) cointegrating equations at the 5% critical value.

IV.4.4. Stability Test
The VAR system at its optimal lag should be stable. Unstable VAR system will make the
results of Impulse Response Function (IRF) and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD)
are not valid. The stability test based on modulus or unit-circle will be applied to determine if
the VAR system at its optimal lag is stable within its unit-circle or with modulus less than one.
Table appendix III.7 and table appendix III.8 in the appendix show the results of stability test for
original VAR system (optimal lag = 2) and alternative Islamic VAR system (optimal lag = 2),
respectively. Original VAR system is stable up to lag 10 with modulus 0.184767 √ 0.984235,
while alternative Islamic system is stable up to lag 11 with modulus 0.070512 √ 0.997073.

IV.4.5. Results
a. Impulse Response Function
Table III.3 shows the summary of IRF results for CPI inflation shocks by various conventional
determinants of inflation.
Table III.3
Impulse Response Function Summary
SHOCK
lnFM Fiat Money

InIR Interest Rate

LnEXC Exchange Rate

ORIGINAL

ISLAMIC

Positive and permanent at

Positive and permanent at

0.004
0.004, stabilize in 16th

0.001, stabilize in 10th

period

period

Positive and permanent at

Negative and permanent at

0.013
0.013, stabilize in 22th

0.002, stabilize in 16th

SHOCK
lnJM Just Money

PLS PLS Returns

period

period

Positive and permanent at

Positive and permanent at

lnGOLD Single Global

0.006
0.006, stabilize in 17th

0.0008, stabilize in 8th

Currency

period

period
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Figure III.1 shows that the responses of financial crisis (CPI inflation) to the shock of root
causes of the crisis are varies, where interest rate lnIR and multiple currency system or exchange
rate lnEXC give the biggest positive impact, followed by lnFM to the crisis in Indonesia. Whereas,
figure III.2 shows that the responses of financial crisis (CPI inflation) to the shock of alternative
Islamic substitutes are mostly very small.
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Figure III.7
Response of Financial Crisis (CPI Inflation) to Fiat Money and Just Money

Figure III.7 compares the impact of fiat money lnFM and just money lnJM to financial
crisis (CPI inflation). It shows that lnFM gives greater and permanent positive impact to the
crisis, while lnJM only gives smaller and permanent positive impact to the crisis. Moreover,
estimation results show that lnFM gives statistically significant impact in the long-term, while
lnJM gives statistically no significant impact to the crisis.
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Figure III.8
Response of Financial Crisis (CPI Inflation) to Interest Rate and PLS Returns
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Figure III.8 compares the impact of interest rate IR and PLS returns RS to financial crisis
(CPI inflation). It clearly shows that INT gives much greater and permanent impact to the crisis
than that of PLS. Moreover, estimation results show that IR is statistically significant in the
short-term and long-term, while RS are statistically not significant in short-term but significant
(negative) in long-term.
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One S.D. LNEXC Innovation

Response of LNINF to Cholesky
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Figure III.9
Response of Financial Crisis (CPI Inflation) to Multiple Currencies and Single Global Currency

Figure III.9 compares the impact of multiple currency system lnEXC and single global
currency system lnGOLD to financial crisis (CPI inflation). It clearly shows that lnEXC gives much
greater and permanent impact to the crisis than that of lnGOLD. Moreover, estimation results
show that lnEXC is statistically significant to influence the crisis in the long-term, while lnGOLD
is also statistically significant to influence the crisis.
b. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Figure III.10 compares the results of Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) of
original and alternative Islamic models. Figure 4.6 (left) shows FEVD of original model, where
fiat money (lnFM 2.8%), interest√rate (INT 45.2%), and exchange rate (lnEXC 18.6%) give
66.6% share to the behavior of financial crisis (CPI inflation).
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Figure III.10
FEVD of Conventional and Islamic Models of Determinants of Inflation

Meanwhile, figure III.10 (right) shows FEVD of alternative Islamic model, where just money
supply (lnJM 0.7%), PLS returns (RS 2.5%), and single global currency (lnGOLD 0.2%) give only
3.4% share to the behavior of financial crisis (CPI inflation).

IV.4.6. Analysis
The phenomena of financial crisis first appeared in the debasement of metallic currency,
i.e., when gold or silver coins as currency was diluted with other metals by the government to
increase the total number of coins issued without a requirement to increase the amount of
gold used to make them. This is essentially the transgression of Allah»s law and the natural
balance. At that time that was the only option to create money without any counter-value,
while the transgression of Allah»s law will result in natural imbalance, catastrophe or crisis. In
contemporary conventional economics this is called seigniorage income from printing fiat money
that causes excess money supply. Ibnu Arabi stated that every economic transaction without
any «iwad or counter-value will amounted to riba. Moreover, gold and silver as currency were
originally public goods which now can be owned privately, so that piling and hoarding gold/
silver become legal, which were previously prohibited.
Nevertheless, in today»s sophisticated economic and finance, financial crisis is not solely
due to riba from money creation or the printing of fiat money. Other sources of financial crisis
are many forms of riba and many forms of maysir. Many forms of riba include money creation
from paper fiat money, fractional reserve banking system, interest system, credit card, derivatives,
etc. Many forms of maysir include stocks/assets trading to make capital gain, forwards, future
and options contracts, derivatives products (such as Credit Default Swaps), etc.
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Financial crisis triggered from inflation is recognized by Austrian school as ideological
and political diseases, where the government deliberately runs inflation economics. Therefore,
to get rid of inflation triggered financial crisis is just a matter of political will and commitment.
Austrian school offers two choices, inflation or gold standard (i.e., replace fiat money with gold
standard and replace fractional reserve banking with free banking).
Most root causes of financial crises have been recognized by conventional as well as
Islamic perspectives, although there are some differences among different conventional school
of thought. However, Islamic perspective has gone further into the detail and some more (such
as, interest, credit card, derivatives, corruption, and poor administration).
Massive efforts have been made to get rid of financial crises with more failures than
success due to the failure to distinguish natural and artificial (human error, criminal activities)
root causes of financial crises. We should understand natural causes, but natural causes should
not be used as an excuse/smoke screen to allow artificial causes (criminal activities) to continue.
Artificial causes of financial crises can be eradicated.
In the end, economic and financial systems are ideological and political choices of economic
regimes taken by the government. With the political will and commitment by the government,
financial crises can be gradually and systematically eradicated and controlled.
From the empirical exercise, riba rooted causes of financial crises (lnFM fiat money 2.8%,
IR interest rate 45.2%, and lnEXC exchange rate 18.6%) give 66.6% share to financial crises in
Indonesia, while if we replace these three systems according to Islamic perspective (lnJM just
money supply 0.7%, RS PLS return 2.5%, and lnGOLD single global currency 0.2%) will give
only 3.4% share to financial crises in Indonesia, or a massive reduction of 63.2%.
Interest rate IR is the most dominant source of financial crises (45.2%) and exchange rate
lnEXC is the second most dominant source of financial crises (18.6%). The replacement of
interest rate IR with PLS returns RS alone will reduce 42.7% share of financial crisis in Indonesia.
The further replacement of multiple currency system lnEXC with single global currency lnGOLD
will reduce further 18.4% share of financial crises in Indonesia.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
V.1. Conclusions
Financial crisis first occurred as a transgression of Allah»s law in one form of riba, i.e., deliberate
debasement of metallic currencies, by the government which caused natural imbalance and
catastrophe manifested in the form of hyperinflation in Egypt (14th century) and first two
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crises in the UK (19th century). The transgressions have been expanded and sophisticated in
many form of riba and many form of maysir. Many forms of riba include money creation from
paper fiat money, fractional reserve banking system, interest system, credit card, derivatives,
etc. Many forms of maysir include stocks/assets trading to make capital gain, forwards, future
and options contracts, derivatives products (such as Credit Default Swaps), etc.
The root causes of financial crises from Islamic economic literatures can be human error and
natural phenomenon uncontrollable by human. Human error can be divided into three
groups, namely (1) moral decadences that trigger (2) system or conceptual flaws and (3)
internal weaknesses.
From the empirical exercise, riba rooted causes of financial crises (lnFM fiat money 2.8%, IR
interest rate 45.2%, and lnEXC exchange rate 18.6%) give 66.6% share to financial crises
in Indonesia, while if we replace these three systems according to Islamic perspective (lnJM
just money supply 0.7%, RS PLS return 2.5%, and lnGOLD single global currency 0.2%) will
give only 3.4% share to financial crises in Indonesia, or a massive reduction of 63.2%.
Empirical results show that if the main three root causes of financial crises (fiat money,
interest, and exchange rate) were substituted by their Islamic alternatives (just money supply,
PLS, and single global currency) , three riba rooted causes of financial crises can be eliminated.
It leaves to the government to make political will and commitment to eradicate and control
financial crises.
The maysir rooted causes of financial crises can also be eliminated with prohibitions or
restrictions of speculative transactions, contracts and products.

V.2. Recommendations
In a country adopting dual monetary system, like Indonesia, root causes of financial crises
can be partly eradicated and partly controlled. The extension of eradication can go as far as
Austrian school with the elimination of money and credit creations, as well as the restriction
of speculative activities gradually and systematically. What essentially required is government
will and commitment. Other inflation determinants that cannot be eliminated should be
controlled tightly with discipline.
Under dual monetary system, to minimize the negative impact of financial crisis can be
done by increasing the share of PLS-based Islamic finance (banking, capital market, insurance,
mutual funds, etc.) and adopting PLS returns as policy rate anchor as well as PLS-based
monetary instruments, since PLS returns has no significant share to financial crisis.
This study can be improved and extended by adding variables of maysir rooted causes of
financial crisis, by the selection of more proper proxies (especially for lnFM and lnJM), by
applying alternative methods, and by comparing with other countries.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol12/iss1/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v12i1

68

Ascarya: LESSONS LEARNED FROM REPEATED FINANCIAL CRISES: AN ISLAMIC ECONOM
Lessons Learned from Repeated Financial Crises: an Islamic Economic Perspective

65

REFERENCES

A. Conventional Economic Literatures
Batunanggar, Sukarela. 2002. ≈Indonesia»s Banking Crisis Resolution: Lessons and the Way
Forward.∆ Bank Indonesia Working Paper WP/12/2002. Jakarta: Bank Indonesia.
Barro, Robert J. 2001. ≈Economic Growth in East Asia before and after the Crisis.∆ NBER Working

Paper no.8330. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Caprio, Gerard and Daniela Klingelbiel. 1996. ≈Bank Insolvencies: Cross Country Experience.∆

Policy Research Working Papers no.1620. Washington, DC: World Bank, Policy and Research
Department.
Caprio, Gerard, and Daniela Klingebiel, 2002. ≈Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Banking
Crises.∆In Managing the Real and Fiscal Effects of Banking Crises, edited by Daniela Klingebiel
and Luc Laeven. World Bank Discussion Paper no. 428, 31√49. Washington, D.C.: World
Bank.
Caprio, Gerard, Daniela Klingebiel, Luc Laeven, and Guillermo Noguera. 2005. ≈Banking Crisis
Database.∆ In Systemic Financial Distress: Containment and Resolution, edited by Patrick
Honohan and Luc Laeven. Cambridge University Press.
Caprio, Gerard, James A. Hanson, and Robert E. Litan (ed.). 2005. Financial Crises: Lessons

from the Past, Preparation for the Future. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.
..
Caprio, Gerard, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Edward J. Kane. 2008. ≈The 2007 Meltdown in Structured
Securitization.∆ Policy Research Working Paper no.4756. Washington, D.C.: World Bank,
Development Research Group.

..
Chailloux, Alexandre, Simon Gray, Ulrich Kluh, Seiichi Shimizu, and Peter Stella. 2008. ≈Central
Bank Response to the 2007√08 Financial Market Turbulence: Experiences and Lessons
Drawn.∆ IMF Working Paper WP/08/210. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Claessens, Stijn, Daniela Klingebiel, and Luc Laeven. 2004. ≈Resolving Systemic Financial Crises:
Policies and Institutions.∆ Policy Research Paper. Washington: World Bank.
Davies, Roy and Glyn Davies. 1996. A History of Money from Ancient Times to the Present Day,
Univesity of Wales Press.
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2009

69

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 12, No. 1 [2009], Art. 2
66

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, July 2009

Development Research Group. 2008. ≈Lessons from World Bank Research on Financial Crises.∆

Policy Research Working Paper no.4779. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Development
Research Group.
Dooley, Michael. 2000. ≈A Model of Crises in Emerging Markets.∆ Economic Journal 110, no.
460: 256√73.
Dooley, Michael, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber. 2003. ≈An Essay on the Revived
Bretton Woods System,∆ NBER Working Paper no.9971. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Eichengreen, Barry. 2004. ≈Global Imbalances and the Lessons of Bretton Woods.∆ NBER Working

Paper no.10497. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, May.
Ergungor, O. Emre and James B. Thomson. 2005. ≈Systemic Banking Crises.∆ Policy Discussion

Papers. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Goldstein, Morris. 2005. ≈The Next Emerging-Market Financial Crisis: What Might It Look Like?∆
In Financial Crises: Lessons from the Past, Preparation for the Future, edited by Gerard
Caprio, James A. Hanson, and Robert E. Litan. Brookings Institution Press.
Hanson, James A. 2005. ≈Postcrisis Challenges and Risk in East Asia and Latin America: Where
Do They Go from Here?.∆ In Financial Crises: Lessons from the Past, Preparation for the

Future, edited by Gerard Caprio, James A. Hanson, and Robert E. Litan. Brookings Institution
Press.
Kaminsky, Graciela, and Carmen Reinhart. 1999. ≈The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and
Balance of Payments Problems.∆ American Economic Review 89, no. 3: 473√500.
Kaminsky, Graciela L., Carmen M. Reinhart, and Carlos A. Vegh. 2003. ≈The Unholy Trinity of
Financial Contagion.∆ NBER Working Paper no.10061. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Kenward, Lloyd. 2002. From the Trenches, The First Year of Indonesia»s Crisis 1997/98 as Seen

from the World Bank»s Office in Jakarta. Jakarta: Center for International and Strategic Studies.
Kindleberger, Charles P. 2000. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. New
York: John Wiley.
Krugman, Paul. 1979. ≈A Model of Balance of Payments Crises.∆ Journal of Money, Credit,

and Banking 11, no. 3: 311√25.
Laeven, Luc and Fabian Valencia. 2008. ≈Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database.∆ IMF

Working Paper WP/08/224. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol12/iss1/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v12i1

70

Ascarya: LESSONS LEARNED FROM REPEATED FINANCIAL CRISES: AN ISLAMIC ECONOM
Lessons Learned from Repeated Financial Crises: an Islamic Economic Perspective

67

Lietaer, Bernard, Robert Ulanowicz, and Sally Goerner. 2008. ≈White Paper on the Options for
Managing Systemic Bank Crises.∆ Mimeo.
~

«

Lindgren, Carl-John, Tomas J. T. Balino, Charles Enoch, Anne-Marie Gulde, Marc Quintyn, and
Leslie Teo. 1999. ≈Financial Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons from Asia.∆ Occasional Paper
no.188. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Mussa, Michael. 2005. ≈Sustaining Global Growth while Reducing External Imbalances.∆ In

The United States and the World Economy, edited by C. Fred Bergsten. Washington: Institute
for International Economics.
Perry, Guillermo, and Luis Serven. 2003. ≈The Anatomy of a Multiple Crisis: Why Was Argentina
Special and What Can We Learn from It?∆ Mimeo. Washington: World Bank.
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2008. ≈Is the 2007 US Sub-prime Financial Crisis
So Different? An International Historical Comparison.∆ NBER Working Paper no.13761.
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Roubini, Nouriel, and Brad Setser. 2005. ≈Will the Bretton Woods 2 Regime Unravel Soon? The
Risk of a Hard Landing in 2005√2006.∆ Paper written for the symposium ≈The Revived
Bretton Woods System: A New Paradigm for Asian Development?∆ Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, San Francisco, February 4.
Yanuarti, Tri dan Akhis R. Hutabarat. 2006. ≈Perbandingan Determinan Inflasi Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand dan Filipina.∆ Bank Indonesia Working Paper WP/05/2006. Jakarta: Bank
Indonesia.
B. Islamic Economic Literatures
Al-Jarhi, Mabid Ali. 2004. ≈Remedy for Banking Crises: What Chicago and Islam Have In
Common: A Comment.∆ Islamic Economic Studies vol.11 no.2. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic
Research and Training Institute.
Ali, Salman Syed. 2006/2007. ≈Financial Distress and Bank Failure: Lessons from Closure of
Ihlas Finans in Turkey.∆ Islamic Economic Studies vol.14 no.1&2. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic
Research and Training Institute.
Ali, Salman Syed. 2007. ≈Financial Distress and Bank Failure: Relevance for Islamic Banks.∆ In

Islamic Banking and Finance: Fundamentals and Contemporary Issues, edited by Salman
Syed Ali and Ausaf Ahmad, Islamic Research and Training Institute √ Universiti Brunei
Darussalam, IRTI.

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2009

71

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 12, No. 1 [2009], Art. 2
68

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, July 2009

Ascarya. 2007. Akad dan Produk Bank Syariah. Jakarta, Indonesia: Rajawali Pers.
Ascarya, Ali Sakti, Noer A. Achsani, dan Diana Yumanita. 2008. ≈Towards Integrated Monetary
Policy under Dual Financial System: Interest System vs. Profit-and-Loss Sharing System.∆

Paper. UII-UKM International Forum on Islamic Economics: International Workshop on
Exploring Islamic Economic Theory, Islamic University of Indonesia,Yogyakarta, Indonesia,
August 11-12.
Ascarya, Heni Hasanah, dan Noer A. Achsani. 2008. ≈Demand for Money and Monetary Stability
under Dual Financial System in Indonesia.∆ Paper. USIM Third Islamic Banking, Accounting
and Finance Conference 2008, ≈Financial Intelligence in Wealth Management. Islam Hadhari»s

Perspectives,∆ Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur Malaysia, July 29-30.
Garcia, Valeriano F., Vicente Fretes Cibils, and Rodolfo Maino. 2004 ≈Remedy for Banking
Crises: What Chicago and Islam Have In Common.∆ Islamic Economic Studies, vol.11 no.2.
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Institute.
Harahap, Sofyan S. 2008. ≈Ekonomi Syariah, Bretton Woods, KTT ASEM, dan AS.∆ Harian

Republika 3 November hal.6. Indonesia.
Hasan, Zubair. 2002. ≈The 1997-1998 Financial Crisis in Malaysia: Causes, Response, and
Results.∆ Islamic Economic Studies, vol.9 no.2. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research and
Training Institute.
Hasan, Zubair. 2003. ≈The 1997-1998 Financial Crisis in Malaysia: Causes, Response, and
Results √ A Rejoinder.∆ Islamic Economic Studies, vol.10 no.2. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic
Research and Training Institute.
Idris, Handi R. 2008. ≈OKI, IDB Bersikaplah!∆ Harian Republika 3 November hal.7. Indonesia.
Izhar, Hylmun. 2008. ≈Keuangan Syariah dan Krisis Ekonomi.∆ Harian Republika 3 November
hal.6. Indonesia.
Rusydiana, Aam S. dan Ascarya. 2008. ≈Determinan Inflasi Indonesia: Perbandingan Pendekatan
Islam dan Konvensional.∆ Mimeo.
Sakti, Ali. 2007. Sistem Ekonomi Islam: Jawaban atas Kekacauan Ekonomi Modern. Paradigma
& Aqsa Publishing, Jakarta, Indonesia.
Sanrego, Yulizar D. dan Nuruddin Mhd. Ali. 2008. ≈Krisis Global dan Babak Baru Ekonomi
Islam.∆ Mimeo.
Shodiq, Muhammad. 2008. ≈Ekonomi Syariah, Solusi Krisis Keuangan Global.∆ Harian Republika
24 November hal.6. Indonesia.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol12/iss1/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v12i1

72

Ascarya: LESSONS LEARNED FROM REPEATED FINANCIAL CRISES: AN ISLAMIC ECONOM
Lessons Learned from Repeated Financial Crises: an Islamic Economic Perspective

69

Siddiqi, Muhammad N. 2008. ≈Current Financial Crisis and Islamic Economics.∆ Mimeo.
Thomas, Abdulkader. 2008. ≈Lessons Not to Learn.∆ Islamic Finance Asia October/November
edition.

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2009

73

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 12, No. 1 [2009], Art. 2
70

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, July 2009

APPENDIX

Table Appendix III.1
The Results of Stationary Tests for Original Model
ADF Value

Variable

Phillips Perron Value

Level

1st Difference

Level

1st Difference

LNINF

-2.054813

-5.813510

-2.205655

-6.031241

LNFM

-0.451516

-5.129169

-0.539663

-4.935065

LNEXC

-3.353963

-7.634553

-3.433336

-7.634553

IR

-2.299623

-3.148172

-1.535057

-3.085059

Note: Boldface indicates that the data is stationary at 5% McKinnon critical value.

Table Appendix III.2
The Results of Stationary Tests for Alternative Islamic Model
ADF Value

Variable

Phillips Perron Value

Level

1st Difference

Level

1st Difference

LNINF

-2.054813

-5.813510

-2.205655

-6.031241

LNJM

-2.178651

-7.508594

-1.469565

-4.661710

LNGOLD

-2.777781

-8.408193

-2.875405

-8.429406

PLS

-3.232887

-11.17122

-3.110523

-11.86335

Note: Boldface indicates that the data is stationary at 5% McKinnon critical value.

Table Appendix III.3
The Results of Optimal Lag Selection Tests for Original Model
Lag

LogL

0

545.3692

1

597.2678

2

620.6983

3
4

LR

FPE

AIC

SC

HQ

NA

5.20E-12

96.78388

1.97E-12

-14.63160

-14.50706

-14.58192

-15.60183

-14.97911*

41.16155*

-15.35342

1.62E-12*

-15.80266*

-14.68176

-15.35552*

630.0964
633.9896

15.49426

1.95E-12

-15.62423

-14.00515

-14.97836

5.997599

2.76E-12

-15.29702

-13.17977

5

-14.45242

641.4880

10.74096

3.58E-12

-15.06724

-12.45182

6

-14.02392

652.4645

14.53645

4.30E-12

-14.93147

-11.81787

-13.68942
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Table Appendix III.4
The Results of Optimal Lag Selection Tests for Alternative Islamic Model
Lag

LogL

LR

FPE

AIC

SC

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

-36.95116
329.3795
343.7805
357.4346
375.1223
388.3613
395.6676
412.1965

NA
683.1572
25.29897
22.51087
27.24859*
18.96404
9.675790
20.10282

3.55E-05
2.75E-09*
2.88E-09
3.10E-09
3.02E-09
3.35E-09
4.44E-09
4.68E-09

1.106788
-8.361609*
-8.318391
-8.254990
-8.300603
-8.225982
-7.991015
-8.005312

1.231332
-7.738889*
-7.197495
-6.635917
-6.183354
-5.610557
-4.877414
-4.393534

HQ
1.156470
-8.113198*
-7.871252
-7.609122
-7.456006
-7.182657
-6.748961
-6.564529

Table Appendix III.5
The Results of Cointegration Tests for Original Model
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)

Eigenvalue

Trace
Statistic

5 Percent
Critical Value

1 Percent
Critical Value

None **

0.349216

53.02090

47.21

54.46

At most 1

0.163119

19.08431

29.68

35.65

At most 2

0.058680

5.016495

15.41

20.04

At most 3

0.003023

0.239183

3.76

6.65

*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level

Table Appendix III.6
The Results of Cointegration Tests for Alternative Islamic Model
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)

Eigenvalue

Trace
Statistic

5 Percent
Critical Value

1 Percent
Critical Value

None **

0.297366

47.08473

39.89

45.58

At most 1

0.120815

19.20413

24.31

29.75

At most 2

0.075747

9.032114

12.53

16.31

At most 3

0.034936

2.809291

3.84

6.51

*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level
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Table Appendix III.7
The Results of Stability Tests for Original Model
Model

Kisaran Modulus

Kisaran Modulus

Kisaran Modulus

Kisaran Modulus

Lag 10

0.984235

0.942561

0.910376

0.848700

0.984235

0.942561

0.910376

0.834046

0.961798

0.939534

0.907208

0.834046

0.961798

0.939534

0.907208

0.800115

0.951371

0.937633

0.906425

0.800115

0.951371

0.937633

0.906425

0.695685

0.950928

0.932337

0.900471

0.617155

0.950928

0.932337

0.900471

0.617155

0.942834

0.925312

0.896148

0.510481

0.942834

0.925312

0.896148

0.184767

Table Appendix III.8
The Results of Stability Tests for Original Model
Model

Kisaran Modulus

Kisaran Modulus

Kisaran Modulus

Kisaran Modulus

Lag 11

0.997073

0.833917

0.794679

0.694789

0.925203

0.815483

0.766975

0.687197

0.914299

0.815483

0.766975

0.687197

0.914299

0.795255

0.728143

0.647026

0.903334

0.795255

0.728143

0.647026

0.833917

0.794679

0.694789

0.070512

Table Appendix III.9
The Estimation Results for Original Model
Vector Error Correction Model
Short-term
CointEq1

0.003345

[ 1.16654]

D(LNINF(-1))

-0.115715

[-1.12716]
[ 1.61484]

D(LNFM(-1))

0.035004

D(LNEXC(-1))

0.073466

[ 1.75436]

D(IR(-1))

0.028526

[ 5.07153]*

Long-term
LNFM(-1)

0.840164

[-3.39005]*

LNEXC(-1)

9.629346

[-5.99422]*

IR(-1)

0.078738

[-2.32496]*
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Table Appendix III.10
The Estimation Results for Alternative Islamic Model
Vector Error Correction Model
Short-term
CointEq1

-0.001492

[-0.52098]

D(LNINF(-1))

0.094799

[ 0.81474]

D(LNJM(-1))

0.003005

[ 0.20150]

D(LNGOLD(-1))

-0.004251

[-0.19132]

D(PLS(-1))

-9.73E-05

[-0.08623]

Long-term
LNJM(-1)

-0.350296

[ 0.68344]

LNGOLD(-1)

0.875140

[-2.70461]*

PLS(-1)

-0.309382

[ 3.84134]*
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MODELING OF INDONESIA CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
USING MULTI INPUT INTERVENTION MODEL

P.W. Novianti 1
Suhartono 2

Abstract
There are some events which are expected effecting CPI»s fluctuation, i.e. financial crisis 1997/
1998, fuel price risings, base year changing»s, independence of Timor-Timur (October 1999), and Tsunami
disaster in Aceh (December 2004). During re-search period, there were eight fuel price risings and four
base year changing»s. The objective of this research is to obtain multi input intervention model which can
des-cribe magnitude and duration of each event effected to CPI. Most of intervention re-searches that
have been done are only contain of an intervention with single input, ei-ther step or pulse function. Multi
input intervention was used in Indonesia CPI case because there are some events which are expected
effecting CPI. Based on the result, those events were affecting CPI. Additionally, other events, such as Ied
on January 1999, events on April 2002, July 2003, December 2005, and September 2008, were affecting
CPI too. In general, those events gave positive effect to CPI, except events on April 2002 and July 2003
which gave negative effects.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer Price Index (CPI) is an index to describe the price»s fluctuation of some goods
or services after base year. Indonesia»s CPI is affected by monetary crisis on 1997/1998 (Rupingi,
2001) and fuel price rising (Rosa, 2006). Additionally, there are other events which expected
give contribution to CPI»s fluctuation, e.g. base year changing, independence of Timor-Timur
(October 1999), and Tsunami disaster in Aceh (December 2004). Empirical study about the
period and the magnitude of the effect of those events to Indonesia CPI are needed by
government and Bank of Indonesia to make appropriate policy for stabilizing the fluctuation of
CPI, especially when those events occur again.
A quantitative model that most commonly used for time series forecasting is Autoregressive
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA). However, ARIMA model is not suitable for this CPI case,
because there are some events that make the changing of data pattern. As one of the alternatives,
intervention modeling is used for this case. Intervention modeling was used by Bhattacharya
and Layton (1979) to analyze the effectiveness of seat belt legislation on the Queensland tollroad, Kendall and Ord (1990) to study about the effect of pilots demonstration action at United
Kingdom Airlines, Leonard (2001) when analyzing the effect of price rising and promotion to
the product demand, Rupingi (2001) to know the effect of monetary crisis in 1997/1998 on
Indonesia CPI, and Suhartono (2007) who study the effect of Bali Bomb I to tourism in Bali.
Most of those researches only use an intervention event (single input), either step or
pulse function. In this paper, multi input intervention modeling was used because there are
many factors that affect Indonesia CPI. Multi input intervention modeling is not widely used
and there is no standard procedure like Box-Jenkins method in ARIMA modeling. Therefore, in
this research, we developed multi input intervention modeling in Indonesia CPI. As a result, a
model which can explain the periods and magnitude effect of those events would be produced.

II. THEORY
Intervention model is a model which could be used to evaluate the impact of an
intervention event that is caused by internal or external factor on a time series dataset (Suhartono,
2007). Generally, there are two common types of intervention, i.e., step and pulse functions.
More detail explanations and applications of intervention analysis can be found in Wei (1990),
Bowerman and O»Connell (1993), Hamilton (1994), Brockwell and Davis (1996), Tsay (2005)
and Suhartono (2007). Intervention model can be written as
(IV.1)
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where Yt is a response variable at time t and Xt is an intervention variable that show either exist
or not the effect of an intervention at time t. Xt can be step function St or pulse function Pt.
Then, ωs (B) and δr (B) are defined as

and

Equation (IV.1) shows that the magnitude and period of intervention effect is given by b,

s, and r. The delay time is shown by b, s gives information about the time which is needed for
an effect of intervention to be stable, and r shows the pattern of an intervention effect. The
impact of an intervention model on a time series dataset (Yt* ) is
(IV.2)

II.1. Step Function Single Input Intervention Model
Step function is an intervention type which occurs in a long term. For example, the
analysis of new tax system in Australia since September 2000 (Valadkhani and Platon, 2004)
had applied step function intervention. Intervention step function is written below (Wei, 1990)
(IV.3)
where the intervention starts at T. Step function single input intervention model with b=2, s=1,
and r=1 can be obtained by substituting Equation (IV.3) into (IV.1),
(IV.4)
Therefore, the effect of step function single input intervention is
(IV.5)
If l δ1 l< 1, we have
(IV.6)
Intervention»s effect in Equation (IV.6) can also be written as
(IV.7)
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Simulation of that intervention, with ω0 = 25, ω1 = -10, δ1 = 0.5 and happen in t = 42 is drawn
by Figure IV.1.

Time Series Plot of Xt(Step)

Time Series Plot of Yt (Step)
Xt (Step)

Yt (Step)
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(a)

43
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t

57

64

71

(b)

Figure IV.1
Intervention Model Simulation (a) and Intervention Effect (b) of Step Function Single Input
(b = 2, s = 1, r = 1)

That intervention starts to effect the data on the next two periods after intervention
occurred (b=2), and the magnitude is 25. Three periods after intervention, the escalation of
data is 47.5 and became 64.4 in the fourth period. This increasing becomes permanent effect
and goes to 70.

II.2. Pulse Function Single Input Intervention Model
An intervention which occurs only in a certain time (T ) is called pulse intervention. The
example of this intervention is public election and 11 September attacked in USA which affected
to unemployment rate in USA (Dholakia, 2003). Pulse intervention function is
(IV.8)
Explanation of single input intervention effect with pulse function can be done the same
with step function intervention in Equation (IV.4) until (IV.7). Simulation of pulse single input
intervention model (b=2, s=1, r=1) which the value of and is the same with simulation in
Section II.2 is drawn in Figure IV.2. Figure IV.1 and IV.2 show the difference between step and
pulse intervention and its effects. The effect of step function is felt in a long term, until t > T,
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while pulse function has impermanent effect, where in certain t, time series dataset will not
affected by intervention event.

Time Series Plot of Xt (Pulse)

Time Series Plot of Yt (Pulse)
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Figure IV.2
Intervention Model Simulation (a) and Intervention Effect (b) of Pulse Function Single Input
(b = 2, s = 1, r = 1)

II.3. Multi Input Intervention Model
Multi input intervention model, based on Equation (IV.1), is (Wei, 1990)

Or
(IV.9)

Equation (IV.9) shows that there are k events on a time series dataset. For illustration, we have
multi input intervention with two events, pulse function (b=1, s=2, r=0) which is followed by
step function (b=1, s=1, r=1),
(IV.10)
The impact is
(IV.11)
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also can be written as

Visualization of Equation (IV.10) and the impact are represented by Figure IV.3, where

ω01 = 25, ω11 = -10, ω21 = -5, ω02 = 15, ω12 = -4 and δ1 = 0.5. First intervention is happened at
T1 = 30 and the magnitude is 25 on a period ahead. The pulse function intervention is affecting
until four periods after T1 with the magnitude effect are 10 and 5 on the third and fourth
period, respectively. The effect of pulse intervention will be equal to zero until T2 = 54, when
the second intervention begin. This step intervention is felt one period after T2 and the impact
is 15. On the second until fifth periods, the impacts of this step intervention are 26.5, 32.25,
36.5, and 37.3, respectively. Then, the impact will go to 38.

Time Series Plot of Yt

Time Series Plot of Xt
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Figure IV.3
Intervention Model Simulation (a) and Intervention Impact (b) Multi Input where Pulse
Function (b=1, s=2, r=0) occur at T1 = 30 and is Followed by Step Function (b=1, s=1, r=1)
at T2 = 54
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Now, we will show the other multi input intervention model, where step function
intervention (b=1, s=2, r=0) as the first intervention and will be followed by pulse function
intervention (b=1, s=1, r=1). The model is
,
and the impact is

First intervention, step function intervention, starts to affect the data at one period after the
intervention event occur, and the impact is ω01. This impact will be (ω01 – ω11) in the second
period. On the third period until t = T2, the impact is (ω01 – ω11– ω21). One period after that, the
second intervention, i.e. pulse function intervention, give additional impact to the time series
dataset, ω02. Therefore, the impact will be (ω01 – ω11– ω21+ ω02). The second and third periods after
the second intervention, the impacts are (ω01 – ω11– ω21+ ω02 δ1– ω12) and (ω01 – ω11– ω21+ ω02 δ12– ω12δ1).
Then, the impact decreases gradually goes to zero. Consequently, the impact will be back to
(ω01 – ω11– ω2).

Time Series Plot of Yt.

Time Series Plot of Xt.
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Figure IV.4
Intervention Model Simulation (a) and Intervention Impact (b) Multi Input where Step
Function (b=1, s=2, .r=0) occur at T1 = 30 and is Followed by Pulse Function (b=1, s=1, r=1)
at T2 = 54

Figure IV.4 shows the simulation of multi input intervention where step function is the
first intervention event and the second is pulse function. Here is the initial value for that simulation
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ω01 = 25, ω11 = -10, ω21 = -5, ω02 = 15, ω12 = -4 and δ1 = 0.5 First intervention, which happen at
T1 = 30, starts to affect the data on t = 31, and the impact is 25. There is a rapid increase in
intervention effect (see Figure IV.4(b)) during t = 32 and t = 35, but the effect remain constant
between t = 35 and t = 54. The second intervention happens in T2 = 54 and give effect to the
dataset in one period ahead. That effect starts to yield zero effect since the fifth period after
T2 = 54.

II.4. Parameters Estimation
Let the intervention model that the parameters will be estimated is defined as
(IV.12)
Rewriting Equation (IV.12) as
(IV.13)
or

where

Thus, we have
(IV.14)
The nonlinear least square estimation to estimate those parameters can be found by minimizing
(IV.15)
where t0 = max (p + r + 1, b +p +s +1) and are residuals under white noise assumption and
Normal distribution. Parameters of multi input intervention can be obtained by replacing Equation
(IV.12) with Equation (IV.9) and follow description in Equation (IV.13) through (IV.15).
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The Indonesia CPI dataset contains of 239 observations, started from January 1989 until
November 2008. All of observations (training data) were used to build that model. Generally,
there are five intervention events, which its function is step function, i.e., fuel price rising, base
year changing, financial crisis 1997/1998, and Timor-Timur Independence. On the other hand,
Tsunami disaster is a pulse function. Those events are showed in Table IV.1.
Table IV.1
Intervention Events in Indonesia»s CPI Dataset
Intervention Events
Fuel Price Rising

Base Year Changing

Monetary Crisis
Timor-Timur Independence
Tsunami Disaster

Time

Percentage of the Risings

t

Name of Variable

Jul-91
Jan-93
May-98
Oct -00
Jan-03
Mar-05
Oct-05
May-08
Jan-96
Jan-02
Jan-07
Jul-97
Oct -99
Des-04

22%
27%
71.43%
12%
21%
30%
125%
30%
-

31
49
113
142
169
195
202
233
85
157
217
103
130
192

X31,
X49,
X113,
X142,
X169,
X195,
X202,
X233,
X85,
X157,
X217,
X103,
X130,
X192,

Multi input intervention modeling in Indonesia CPI follows this algorithm, i.e.
(1) Dividing dataset into k+1 parts,
a. Data 1, which is the data before first intervention, as many as n0 series, i.e. t = 1, 2, ...,
T1 – 1. Noted as Y0t.
b. Data 2, which is the data from first intervention until before second intervention, as
many as n1 series, i.e. t = T1, T1 + 1, T1 + 2, ..., T2 – 1. Noted as Y1t.
c. Data k+1, which is data fromkth intervention until the end of data, as many as nk series,
i.e. t = Tk, Tk + 1, Tk + 2, ..., n. Noted as Ykt.
(2) Modeling of first intervention
a. Step 1
ARIMA model»s building for time series dataset before first intervention occurs (Y0t),
so we have
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Forecasting to Data 2 (Y1t ) using ARIMA model. In this step, we get these forecast
data

b. Step 2
Calculate the responses value of first intervention or Y1t *. It is residuals of data on
t = T1, T1 + 1, T1 + 2, ..., T2 – 1, based on the forecasting of ARIMA model in the first
step. This step produces responses value of first intervention,
Identification b1, s1, r1 of first intervention by using the plot of responses value Y*T1,
Y*T1 + 1, ..., Y*T2 – 1 by using the confidence interval, i.e. + 3σa0 (Root Mean Square
Error or MSE of the previous ARIMA model). This interval is based on the determination
of control chart bounds at statistical quality control.
c. Step 3
Parameter estimation and signification test for the first intervention model
Diagnostic checking, by doing residual assumption checking, i.e. white noise and
Normality. In this step, we have first input intervention model
(IV.16)
(3) Building iteratively of the-mth intervention model, where m = 2, 3, ..., k .
a. Step 1
Forecasting of Data m+1 (Ymt ), based on the-mth intervention model. In this step, we
have these forecasting value as follows

b. Step 2
Calculate the-mth intervention responses (Ymt )*, i.e. residual on the data of t = Tm, Tm + 1,
Tm + 2, ..., Tm + 1 – 1, based on the forecasting of the-(m-1)th intervention model. In this
step, we have the response values of the-mth intervention,
Identification of bm, sm, rm from mth intervention model, responses» plot of Y*Tm,
Y*Tm + 1, ..., Y*Tm + 1 – 1, where the confidence interval is + 3σam – 1
c. Step 3
Parameter estimation and signification test for the- mth intervention model
Diagnostic checking, by doing residual assumption test, i.e. white noise and Normality
test. In this step, we have
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(IV.17)
This step is done iteratively until the last intervention, i.e. the-mth intervention. Therefore,
we get multi input intervention model

IV. EMPIRICAL RESULT
Indonesia CPI has tendency to be increasing in every month. There are some dramatic
rises in Indonesia CPI. It can be seen in Figure IV.5.
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Figure IV.5
Time Series Plot of Indonesia CPI during
January 1989-November 2008

The most significant rising of Indonesia CPI happen on era of monetary crisis in 1997/
1998 and fuel price rising on October 2005. Based on Info Bank Publishing (2007), there were
so many job terminations, closing of some banks, and unstable political condition. Therefore,
consumer power parity was decline significantly and effected to Indonesia CPI.
Determination of multi input intervention model in Indonesia CPI follows the algorithm
in Section 3. In the next section, we will give brief explanation about how to build the model
and its effect of each intervention events. However, we only show an event of each intervention
event category. For instance, we use a fuel price rising on May 2008 to represent fuel price
risings events.
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IV.1. Pre Intervention Modeling
Box-Jenkins procedure is used to determine pre intervention model, i.e. ARIMA. The
details of Box-Jenkins procedure can be found in Bowerman and O»Connell (1993). According
to Table IV.1, the first intervention event is fuel price rising on July 1991. However, the data that
should be used to determine ARIMA model is not enough. To obtain ARIMA model, researcher
should have at least fifty observations (Wei, 1990). Therefore, we assumed that monetary crisis
is the first intervention event in Indonesia CPI dataset.
Having identified the data by using Box Cox transformation, we conclude that the data is
not necessary to be transformed. However, Augmented Dickey Fuller test shows that the dataset
have non-constant mean (unstationer). Thus, differencing is applied to get stationery data
(Wei, 1990). Based on ACF and PACF plots, there are several possibilities of ARIMA order.
However, ARIMA (0,1,1)(0,0,1)12 is the best model, because it has the smallest MSE, all parameters
are statistically significant, and residual is white noise. Unfortunately, that model doesn»t satisfy
the Normal distribution. It might be caused by outliers in dataset. After involved the outliers to
ARIMA model and re-estimate parameters, we got a model satisfying the residual assumptions,
both white noise and Normality, i.e.
(IV.18)
MSE of Model (18) is 0.0087. That model shows that the data before intervention is affected by
fuel price rising on July 1991 and January 1993, and also an event on March 1996.

IV.2. Intervention Modeling of Indonesia CPI
First intervention event which affected Indonesia CPI is monetary crisis in 1997/ 1998. It
is a step function intervention. Based on Figure (IV.6), data pattern of ARIMA model forecasting
(green line) is different from data pattern before intervention (red line). It indicates that
intervention occurs and has significant effect.£The first step in intervention modeling is identifying
the value of b, s, and r. This identification is done by evaluating into residual bar chart of pre
intervention model (Figure IV.6(b)).
Based on Figure IV.6(b), we got b=2, s=[1,4,5,6,7], and r=0. The result of parameter
estimation and signification test show that all of parameters are significant, so intervention
model is written as

(IV.19)
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Figure IV.6
(a) Time Series Plot (b) Bar Chart Residual of Pre Intervention Model

Model (IV.19) shows that monetary crisis gives positive escalation. Two months after intervention
occurred, the magnitude of intervention is 0.2. This escalation is become 7.7 in the ninth
month after intervention. The detail of monetary crisis effects is shown in Table IV.2.
Table IV.2
Effects of Monetary Crisis to Indonesia CPI
Time (t)

Month

T+2
T+3 - T+5
T+6
T+7
T+8
T+9

Effect»s Magnitude

September 1997
October-December 1997
January 1998
February 1998
March 1998
April 1998

Time Series Plot Data Aktual, Fit, dan Forecast Hasil Pemodelan Intervensi 1
Data

0.2
0.2+0.3=0.5
0.2+0.3+0.2=0.7
0.2+0.3+0.2+3.7=4.4
0.2+0.3+0.2+3.7+1.8=6.2
0.2+0.3+0.2+3.7+1.8+1.5=7.7

Bar Chart Residual Hasil Pemodelan Intervensi 1
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Figure IV.7
(a) Time Series Plot (b) Residual Bar Chart of Intervention Model because of Monetary Crisis
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The second intervention is fuel price rising on May 1998 (25-71.43%). It gives additional
escalations to Indonesia CPI. Based on the results in Figure 7(b), we got b=0, s=4, and r=0.
Intervention model is

and the impacts are presented in Table IV.3. These results show that the government policy had
direct impact to CPI. In the first month (the same month as this event occurred), CPI rose for
almost 2 points and would be 3.8 points in the following month. Furthermore, CPI on September
1998 was 12.4 points higher than a month before this regulation had been applied. It shows
that the fuel price rising which happened in the crisis era has quite big effect to CPI.
Table IV.3
Effects of Fuel Price Rising on May 1998 to Indonesia CPI
Time (t)
T
T+1
T+2
T+3
T+4

Month
May 1998
June 1998
July 1998
August 1998
September 1998

Effect»s Magnitude
1.9
1.9+1.9 =3.8
1.9+1.9+3.8 =7.6
1.9+1.9+3.8+2.9 =10.5
1.9+1.9+3.8+2.9+1.9 =12.4

Modeling of multi input intervention is continued by detecting the order for the next
intervention, independence of Timor-Timur. Theoretically, Timor-Timur was not being part of
Indonesia in 2002, but BPS has not included Dili (former capital city of Timor√Timur) in CPI»s
calculating since October 1999. Therefore, we assume that independence of Timor-Timor
happened on October 1999. As the previous intervention, order detection is done by evaluating
on to residual bar chart of the previous intervention model.
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Figure IV.8
(a) Time Series Plot (b) Residual Bar Chart of Intervention Model because of Fuel Price Rising
on May 1998

Thus, we got the new multi input intervention model as follows

Based on that model, the impact is written as in Table IV.4. The independence of Timor-Timur
started to affect CPI dataset in two months after it occurred. The escalation remained stable
during December 1999 - June 2000, but there was a slight increase in Indonesia CPI on July and
August 2000.
Table IV.4
Effects of Independence of Timor-Timur to Indonesia CPI
Time (t)
T+2 - T+8
T+9
T+10
T+11

Month
December 1999-June 2000
July 2000
August 2000
September 2000
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Figure IV.9
(a) Time Series Plot (b) Residual Bar Chart of Intervention Model because of Fuel Price Rising
on October 2000

Based on the result at Table IV.1, the next intervention is fuel price rising on October
2000. By using the same step as the previous intervention, we got the new intervention model.
Then, we applied that model to identify the order of the next intervention event, base year
changing on 2002. In each base year changing, BPS always magnifies the number of commodities
and cities. To know the effect of this addition, we consider that it is an intervention event.
Figure IV.9 shows that an intervention event effects CPI dataset. Estimation and signification
test for parameter yields intervention model as follows

Government raised the price of fuel on January 2003. The percentage of this rising is 3
until 28 percent. Surprisingly, this government»s policy was not affected to CPI. It can be seen in
Figure IV.10, where there is no residual which out of the confidence interval. However, residuals
on t=175 and t>180 are out of the limit. It indicates that there are other intervention effects in
CPI dataset. Having included those observations and re-estimates parameters coefficients, the
model is re-written as
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol12/iss1/2
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(IV.20)

Time Series Plot of Aktual,fits, for

Bar Chart Residual Hasil Pemodelan Tadas 02

Data

Residual

80
70
60

T

3

Variable
Aktual
fits
for

2

50

1

40

0.452
30

0

20
10
Month Jan
Year 1989

-0.452
-1
Jan
1991

Jan
1993

Jan
1995

Jan
1997

Jan
1999

Jan
2001

Jan
2003

-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1213 1415 1617 1819 20 2122
T

(a)

(b)

Figure IV.10
(a) Time Series Plot (b) Residual Bar Chart of Intervention Model because of base year
changing on 2002

Model (IV.20) is used to obtain the order of Tsunami disaster, which is the next intervention
event. The new model for intervention after included this intervention event is

That model gives information that Tsunami disaster affected to CPI only in the first month after
that event happened. The increasing of CPI is 0.5 on January 2005.
By using the same steps, modeling of intervention with all of intervention events on Table
(IV.1) produces multi input intervention model as follows
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(IV.21)

Multi input intervention Model (IV.21) has high value of kurtosis. It can be caused by a lot of
residual which have zero value. RMSE of this multi input intervention model is 0.184.
Besides those events which were written on Table IV.1, Equation (IV.21) shows that Ied on
January 1999 (X121), events on December 2005 and September 2008 (X237) give positive impact
in Indonesia CPI. Whereas, events on April 2002 (X160) and July 2003 (X175) yield negative effect
to Indonesia CPI. Table IV.2 gives details information about each event»s effect. Fuel price risings
tend to give direct and positive effect to CPI. During research period, there is only one of fuel
price raisings that not affecting CPI which happened on January 2003. Conversely, the highest
percentage of fuel price rising happened on October 2005 (125 percent), as a result, CPI rose
more than 6 points in that month.
Fuel price risings do not have big impact during Orde Baru era. However, it gives quite big
impact in Reformation era. For instance, there was a slight increase in CPI because of fuel price
rising on January 1993 (27 percent), but this regulation yields high rising on CPI when the
percentage of escalation was only 30 percent (March 2005). It shows that CPI is more sensitive
by fuel price rising in Reformation Era than Orde Baru era.

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol12/iss1/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v12i1

96

Ascarya: LESSONS LEARNED FROM REPEATED FINANCIAL CRISES: AN ISLAMIC ECONOM
Modeling of Indonesia Consumer Price Index Using Multi Input Intervention Model

93

Table IV.5
Interventions» effect to Indonesia CPI
Interventions
Fuel Price Rising

Time

Percentage
of the Rising

First Effect
was Felt

Effect»s Type

First Period»s
Effect

Jul-91

22%

Directly

Positive & Permanent

0.3

Jan-93

27%

Directly

Positive & Permanent

0.3

May-98

71 %

Directly

Positive & Permanent

1.9

Oct-00

12%

Delay 2 months

Positive & Permanent

0.6

Jan-03

21%

-

-

-

Mar-05

30%

Directly

Positive & Permanent

1.2

Oct-05

125%

Directly

Positive & Permanent

6.3
1.3

May-08

30%

Directly

Positive & Permanent

Base Year

Jan-96

-

-

-

-

Changing

Jan-02

-

Directly

Positive & Permanent

0.7

Jan-07

-

-

-

-

Monetary Crisis

Jul-97

-

Delay 6 months

Positive & Permanent

1.2

Independence of

Oct-99

-

Delay 2 months

Positive & Permanent

0.6

Des-04

-

Delay 1 month

Positive & Temporary

0.4

Timor-Timur
Tsunami Disaster
Ied

Jan-99

-

Directly

Positive & Temporary

0.4

Unknown Events

Apr-02

-

Directly

Negative & Temporary

- 0.3

Jul-03

-

Directly

Negative & Permanent

- 0.3

Des-05

-

Directly

Positive & Temporary

0.4

Sept-08

-

Directly

Positive & Permanent

0.5

Monetary crisis in 1997/1998 gave positive and permanent effect to CPI. Though the
effect was felt six months after it started, the CPI increased gradually in that month, 1.2. Other
event, independence of Timor-Timur is also give positive and permanent impact.

V. CONCLUSION
In general, we conclude that multi input intervention model which was obtained able to
describe precisely the effects of events which affected to Indonesia CPI during January 1989 √
November 2008. Based on that model, there are some events that significantly impact to CPI,
i.e. fuel price risings, monetary crisis, base year changing on January 2002, independence of
Timor-Timur, Tsunami disaster, Ied on January 2002, and unknown events on December 2005
and also September 2008. Those events yield positive impact to CPI. On the contrary, unknown
events on April 2002 and July 2003 produce negative effect to CPI. This model has 0.184 of
RMSE (standard error) and high kurtosis value that indicate the residual has leptokurtic pattern.
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Abstract
With the development of sukuk market as the Islamic alternatives of the existing bond market, the
issue of how to assign a rating to the sukuk issuance rises. This study tries to provide an empirical foundation
for the investors to estimate the ratings assign. Using approach from several rating agencies, past researches
on bond ratings, financial distress prediction and bankruptcy prediction models, this study is trying to
innovate a new model on determining the sukuk ratings. It used Multinomial Logit regression to create a
model of rating probability from several theoretical variables, ie. firm size, leverage, profitability, fixed
payment coverage, reputation and existence of guarantor. The result shows 80% of all valid cases are
correctly classified into their original rating classes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A credit rating is an assessment of the credit worthiness of a corporation or security,
most often based on the history of borrowing and repayment for the issuer, its underlying
assets, its outstanding liabilities and its overall business performance. These credit ratings fulfil
a key function of information transmission in capital market. Issuers seek ratings for a number
of reasons, including to improve the trust of their business counterparties or because they
wish to sell securities to investors with preferences over ratings. Many investors rely on ratings
in their investment decisions. For these reasons, ratings are considered important by issuers
and investors alike. Money market also plays a vital role for Islamic Economics, not in the least
for controlling and regulating money supply in the economy. The main jurist problem with
conventional money instruments relates to their pre-dominant debt-based structure.
Nonetheless, the recent upsurge in short term Islamic bonds (sukuk or certificates), seems to
have filled a significant gap in the growing Islamic financial markets. In order to reduce
information asymmetries that exist between companies and investors in Islamic capital market,
it is also compulsory to study on the credit rating behaviour in Islamic financial instruments
specially sukuk. However, until this recent time, there is has not been many studies with
regard to this issue. Thus, it is considered that any research effort directed to analyze and
investigate the ratings given by the agencies would become great benefit to all users of sukukrating information and to the Islamic capital market.
Malaysian corporate sukuk market has continued to expand and mature, affirming the
role that Islamic finance plays in mobilising the capital needed by corporate. According to the
statistics released by Bank Negara Malaysia (≈BNM∆), total outstanding sukuk issues as at endJune 2006 stood at RM130.95 billion, some 72% of which stemmed from the corporate sector.
Therefore, the main motivation for this research is an attempt to contribute to filling this gap in
Malaysia sukuk which is significant in World»s capital markets, as well as in literature studies
and the academic libraries.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There is no previous study on sukuk rating known. However, considering the similar
nature of sukuk to conventional corporate bonds, and the fact that most part of assessment
towards conventional bonds are also applicable to assess a sukuk issuance, we utilize
combination of bond-rating approaches from several rating agencies, as well as bankruptcy
and financial distress study approach as literature. The literature review is divided into two
main parts. The first part provides a review of rating agency approach on sukuk rating and
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol12/iss1/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v12i1

102

Ascarya: LESSONS LEARNED FROM REPEATED FINANCIAL CRISES: AN ISLAMIC ECONOM
Determinant of Sukuk Ratings

99

selected related past research works on prediction on bond rating, company financial
bankruptcy and company financial distress. Second part provides the hypotheses with the
theoretical framework and some previous findings that justifies the selection of each variables
used in this study.

II.1. Rating Agencies approach
Sukuk, like conventional bonds, are financial instruments that are easily marketable and
transferable in the secondary market. Sukuk can also receive credit ratings and allow for credit
enhancement through the posting of additional collateral. On the surface, therefore, Sukuk
may not appear very different from other credit enhanced trust certificates that are backed by
an equipment encumbrance. It is important to note, however, that an asset-based sukuk have
different features with an asset-backed Sukuk or asset-backed secured claims.
An asset-based Sukuk represent an ownership interest in a specific asset so as to identify
the claimable proportional profit, not the asset itself, generated from that particular asset.
While effectively structured asset-backed securities represent a secured claim on some specific
underlying equipment, such as airplanes, that can be seized and liquidated in order to service
a debt claim. It is for this reason that Fitch would tend to view asset-based Sukuk issues as
senior-unsecured obligations deserving of the same issuer default rating (IDR) as the originator
of the issue in question. As mentioned earlier, however, Sukuk can be credit enhanced and
rated, just like secured debt, if additional asset encumbrances are wrapped into the Sukuk
issues. S&P»s rating are opinion on the issuer»s ability and willingness to meet financial obligations
in a timely manner, without commenting on Sharia compliance. The rating on Islamic debt
instruments varies, depending on the degree of performance risk of the asset backing
transaction and on the type of collateral and transaction structure. At MARC, Sukuk ratings
are not fundamentally different from conventional ratings. The Sukuk issuances that MARC
has rated to date have all been rated by applying conventional credit rating methodology. For
RAM, the assessment of Shariah forms an added assessment factor to its analytical framework
of Sukuk. There are two approach being used; first is Asset-backed structure methodology,
which is used if the sukuk transaction encompass essential securitization elements which
establish that credit risk profile is determined solely by the underlying asset, and that sukuk
investors have ownership and reliable security over the assets, while second is if sukuk investor
do not possess realizable security over the asset, then the credit risk assessment will be directed
towards the entity with the issuer. In this instance, RAM would apply the corporate rating
methodology.
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II.2. Previous Studies
A pioneering study on bond rating is done by James Horrigan (1966) who attempted the
first rating-prediction study in the United States, he used five financial variables; (total asset,
working capital/sales, sales/net worth, operating profit/sales, net worth/debt) and was able to
predict correctly 58% and 54% of Moody»s new and changed ratings and also 52% and 57% of
S&P new and changed bond ratings during 1959-1964 period. Then Belkaoui (1980) was putting
forward a broad economic rationale for variable selection into a bond rating model using MDA.
Belkaoui (1980) identified three main variable characteristics that should be included; they are
related to the issuing firm, the issued debt instrument and the variable which represent the
market view of firm. He came out with eight variables; (total asset, total debt, long-term leverage,
short term leverage, interest coverage, current ratio, total leverage, and bond identure). The
model correctly predicted 62.5% to 65% of 275 S&P new and holdout bond ratings in 1978.
This research is followed by Touray (2004), which is used as main reference for this study.
He used eight variables form Belkaoui (1980) to compare modelling using MDA and Multinomial
Logit. The result was Multinomial Logit performed better than MDA with 75% correct prediction
of the new ratings from Rating Agency Malaysia, using 56 bond rating issued in Malaysia
during the period of 1992-2003. Unfortunately, this model cannot be used to predict the
holdout sample during crisis period in Malaysia.
Studies on preliminary symptoms of business failures are one of way to assess credit risks.
The degree of financial distress of a company is determined by the ability to service its debts.
The ability is to be routinely assessed by financing banks which may rate the commercial debts
on the basis of their credit rating models, in line with the recent Basel accords. This shows that
the nature of financial bankruptcy prediction and financial distress prediction is similar with
sukuk ratings whereby financial distress prediction model is in fact also a credit scoring technique.
Based on this reasoning, this research also utilizes previous literatures in financial distress and
financial bankruptcy as reference in determining sukuk ratings variables.
The research by Zulkarnain et al. (2006) tried to develop bankruptcy prediction model of
considerable efficiency for firm listed and traded in small developing economy. He came out
with 22 financial ratios consist of liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency and activity ratio, and
found out that total liability, current assets turnover, and cash ratio are the three most relevant
variables to predict bankruptcy prediction model. The research is further developed by Chancharat
et al. (2007) which tried to investigate the effect of financial ratios, market base variables and
company specific variables on corporate financial distress. He used company age, company
size, squared size, profitability, liquidity and leverage variables. The result shows that financially
distress companies have lower profitability, higher leverage, lower past excess return and larger
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size compared to active companies. Similarly, using combination of financial ratios, Lu et.al
(2008) tried to come up with financial distress model in Taiwan, Other researches include Hadju
and Virag (1996) in Hungaria, Latinen (2007) in Finnish, Merek Gruszczynski (2004) in Poland,
Ugurlu and Aksoy (2006) in Turkey, Zulkarnain et al. (2004) in Malaysia, Santiago and Rosillo
(2001) in Colombia, and Li and Liu (2009) in China. They found that financial indicators analysis
using financial ratios has always been a very useful instrument in evaluating companies» problem
in their operation and finances.
Some of the results also suggest that logistic model still produced promising result in
bankruptcy prediction. Hadju and Virag (1996), Latinen (2007), Gruszczynski (2004) M. Adnan
Aziz and Humayon Dar (2006), Ugurlu and Aksoy (2006), Lu et.al (2008) and Li and Liu (2009)
still use binary or trinomial logistic model as their method. These facts support our utilization of
multinomial logistic model as the method of this research.

II.3. Hypotheses and Theoretical Framework
Hypothesis One about Total Asset (H1)
Horrigan (1966), Kaplan and Urwitz (1979), Belkaoui (1980), Kamstra (2001), Cho et.al
(2002), found total asset to be important element in determining rating. LeClere (2002), Hu
and Hansel (2005), Chancharat et.al (2007), and Li (2009) also use this variable in their research
for predicting the company financial distress and financial bankruptcy. Horrigan (1966) explained
how relative size (expressed in total asset) should make a difference in the eyes of rater or
analyst. His logic was that bigger firms are better prepared to absorb the impact of adverse
effects of economic and other natural crises than smaller firms. Another view is that larger
pools of asset mean more resources are available to the firm for use in potential projects.
Touray (2004) mentioned the bigger the asset size of firm relative to other components, the
greater is the firm ability to provide secure payment to its lender in the event of crises. This led
us to conclude that the bigger the asset size of corporation is, the more likely it will get higher
rating. With that the research proposes the following hypothesis:
H1: Other things being equal, the larger the size of total asset of a firm, the greater the likelihood
that the sukuk is given a higher rating and vice versa.
Hypothesis Two about Long Term Leverage (H2)
Belkaoui (1980), Kim et.al (2001), Chaveesuk et.al (1999) use long-term leverage ratio as
one of variable to determine sukuk rating. Chancharat et.al (2007), Ugurlu (2006), LeClere
(2002), Muhammad Sori (2006) also incorporate the same variable in their research for predicting
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the company financial distress and financial bankruptcy. There should be a positive relationship
between higher leverage and incentive to default on debt. According to them, the transfer of
risk to creditors by taking more debt will undoubtedly result in paying a higher premium and
consequently lead to lower rating too. Touray (2004) have used the ratio of long-term debt to
total invested capital as a proxy measure of leverage and they predict that it is negatively
related to rating, since it is the most frequently used ratios in rating studies to represent the
degree of leverage. With that the research proposes the following hypothesis:
H2: Other things being equal, the lower the ratio of long term debt to total invested capital,
the greater the likelihood that the sukuk gets higher rating than lower rating, vice versa.
Hypothesis Three about Coverage Ratio (H3)
Horrigan (1966), Belkaoui (1980), Kamstra (2001), Touray (2004) argue the interest
coverage ratio is a strong indicator of a firm»s financial strength. Gibson (1998), observes that
firms in the regulated utility enjoy a lower cost of fund and also have more fund raising ability
compared to firms in other sectors. This is due to their stable earning and higher coverage ratio
record over time. The interest coverage ratio, which is also known at times as the ≈times
interest earned∆ ratio, is a direct measure of long-term debt paying ability computed from the
income statement. It shows how much the interest payments are covered from the direct cash
flows of the business operations. The higher the interest coverage ratio of firm, the higher the
firm rating is. However, according to Touray (2004), there was conflicting findings about the
significance of this variable in explaining bond ratings. This study will also include this variable
with the following assumption:
H3: Other things being equal, the higher interest coverage ratio of a firm, the greater the
likelihood that the sukuk will be given a higher rating, vice versa.
Hypothesis Four about Return on Asset (ROA) (H4)
Chavesuuk (1999), Kim (2001), Kamstra (2001), Cho et.al (2002), use profitability variable
as one of important variable in rating determination. Hadju and Virag (1996), Wen-Ying, et.al
(2006) and Li and Liu (2009) utilize ROA as one of important profitability variable in modelling
financial distress and financial bankruptcy. Liang et.al (2006) also mentioned profitability variable
is used to measure how well a corporation is creating profit. The higher the profitability ration
will impact to higher rating. In this study we use Return on Asset (ROA) as a proxy measure of
profitability which is also used by Kamstra (2001). The following hypothesis is made regarding
the effect of this variable:
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H4: Other things being equal, the higher profitability ratio of a firm, the greater the likelihood
that the sukuk will be given a higher rating, vice versa.
Hypothesis Five about Beta Company (H5)
According to Kamstra (2001), the actual rating process involves more than just a handful
of quantifiable statistical variables. The rating agencies take into account other unquantifiable
variables such as leadership quality, management ability, and technology changes. Becker and
Milbourn (2008) try to proof the relationship between companies» reputation and rating. All
these previous research lead this study to provide a variable which can represent the existence
of other qualitative variables. With regard to previous finding by Becker and Milbourn(2008),
we decided to use beta company as the proxy of companies» reputation. Ghafar and Saharudin
(2003) investigate the relation between betas and return of Islamic Fund, which are invested in
sukuk and equity instruments. As we know, reputation of company can be seen from its stability
of return, in this case stock return. Impson, Karafiath, and Glasscocl (1992) also look at the
impact of bond re-grading on the firms beta.
H5: Other things being equal, the lower beta of a firm, the greater the likelihood that the
sukuk will be given a higher rating, vice versa.
Hypothesis Six about Guarantee Status Variable (H6)
According to Touray (2004), the guarantee status should be an important determinant of
bond quality rating which assuming has the same nature with sukuk quality rating. In this case,
it is a legal right which gives first payment priority to one kind of debtor over the others in the
event of liquidation, etc. This agreement provides strong protection to senior sukuk holders at
the expense of junior sukuk holders. Consequently, junior sukuk are always lower than senior
sukuk in term of ratings. A the same time, the guarantee status of a bond is a promise that
comes from a third party who provides a guarantee of principal and interest payment in the
event of default. The third party in this case is mostly viewed as having strong financial capability
to honour his promises. Therefore, this variable is included into analysis and model as dummy
variable. It will be presented in our model as suggested by Gujarati (1995) and Touray (2004) as
follows: number 1= represents any sukuk that has a guarantee status and number 0 = will
stand for sukuk without guarantee status. The following hypothesis is made regarding the
effect of this variable:
H6: It is hypothesized that sukuk with guarantee payment status has a greater likelihood of
being given a higher rating than a sukuk without such guarantee.
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III. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
This study use the Multinomial Logistic Regression Model (M-Logit) which also known as
the Polychotomous Logistic Regression Model. This study use one sample (a synthesized current
rating sample) to build the model, predict original cases and test the significance of the variables.
The sample of current ratings originally contains 30 observations taken from RAM website.
Dependent variable which is Four (4) investment rating classes: AAA, AA, A, BBB are used in
this study. Table-1 show the distribution of Sukuk Rating Classes used in this study. RAM assigned
and reaffirmed 211 sukuk ratings announced during 2007 to early 2009. Some sukuk issued by
same issuer but given different ratings comprise from AAA rating to BBB. Few of them have
different ratings because of guarantee status or Junior-Senior sukuk scheme. This condition
forces us to drop some sukuk which is issued by the same issuer with same guarantee status.
Second, each issuer should have complete financial statement data available publicly before
rating announced without any missing variable. This criteria also lead us to omit some sukuk
which has non-listed SPV/issuer company or sukuk issued by government. After eliminating all
from the sample we ended up with 40 sukuk from total 211 sukuk. The independent variable
are taken from RAM website and Bloomberg; Total Asset (X1), Long-Term Leverage Ratio (X2),
Interest Coverage Ratio (X3), ROA (X4), Beta Company (X5) Guarantee status (X6) However,
the company»s financial ratio variables also have some outliers which will be explained later
that reduced our sample size to 30 samples. The table below shows the distributions sukuk
rating classes used in this study.
Table V.1
Distribution of Sukuk Rating
RATING

N

Marginal Percentage

AAA
AA
A

6
13
11

36.7%
43.3%
20%

total

30

100%

IV. METHODOLOGY
If the categorical dependent variable is ordered or unordered in nature and if the problem
involves more than two categories, an extended version of the binary logit model (known as
Polychotomous or Multinomial regression model) can still be applies to the problem (Touray,
2004). Here, we also utilize stepwise model that provided in SPSS, to find the best fit model
according to its significances. The multinomial logit strategy usually involves allowing one
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category to assume specific value, say Y=h0, where h0 = 0. This category is then used as the
reference category for the rest of the other categories. This method is also known as the baseline category type which explained by Menard (1995), Agresti (1996), and Touray (2004). The
M-Logit coefficients in the base line logit model for the four bonds rating categories (AAA, AA,
A, BBB) can be written in general form as suggested by Touray (2004) with reference to Menard
(1995) and Argesti (1996) as:

log

p ( groupj )
= α i 0 + β i1 X 1 + β i 2 X 2 + β i 3 X 3 + β i 4 X 4 + β i 5 X 5 + β i 6 X 6 * ( Dp)
p ( groupJ )

Where: Category J with capitalized J in the denominator refers to the base-line category; the
Category with small j in the numerator refers to any other category.

αi0

= constant term,

β

= respective coefficient on predictor X.

X1 – X6 = predictor (independent) variables
= dummy/binary variables

Dp

This translates into the following equation in our case:

log

p( AAA)
= α i 0 + β i1 X 1 + β i 2 X 2 + β i 3 X 3 + β i 4 X 4 + β i 5 X 5 + β i 6 X 6 * ( Dp)
p( BBB )

log

p( AA)
= α i 0 + β i1 X 1 + β i 2 X 2 + β i 3 X 3 + β i 4 X 4 + β i 5 X 5 + β i 6 X 6 * ( Dp)
p( BBB )

log

p( A)
= α i 0 + β i1 X 1 + β i 2 X 2 + β i 3 X 3 + β i 4 X 4 + β i 5 X 5 + β i 6 X 6 * ( Dp)
p( BBB )

On the collinearity issue, Touray (2004) with reference to Scott Menard (1995) indicated
that collinearity diagnostic test for logistic models can be obtained by running multiple regression
analysis. The issue is to assess the inter-relationship between indicator variables. To test the
general fit of the model we will use the model fit information measured by -2Log Likelihood,
while the Likelihood-Ratio tests method will be used for testing the significance of individual
independent variables, base on the recommendation of Touray (2004) with reference to Norusis
(1999).
Three Pseudo R-Squares measures are used to examine the strength of relationship between
the dependent and independent variables. Two related R-Squares measures that are said to be
proxy of the OLS R-Square methods (Cox and Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2) will be referred to for
testing the strength of association.
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Another common output of the multinomial logistic regression is the classification
table, which is useful to further assess the power of the M-logistic regression model in terms of
the classificatory power of the model in comparison with the actual ratings observed.

V. EMPIRICAL RESULT AND INTERPRETATIONS
V.1. Screening for Normality, Collinearity, Homoscedasticity, Outliers and
Extreme Values
- Outliers and Extreme Values
We use the Steam-and-Leaf Plot graph of SPSS to explore the raw data for individual
extreme values and influential outliers» cases. Several extreme values and outliers were identified
from the raw data. Touray (2004) with reference to Tabachnick and Fidel (1989) noted that
deleting individual influential outlier cases or single variables that contain most of the influential
cases is one of several ways of reducing outlier influence. As mentioned earlier, this further
reduced our sample size to 30 valid observations.
- Normality
Touray (2004) with reference to Tabachnick and Fidel (1989) indicated that group data
distributions are better evaluated using graphical methods; this allow as to see the overall
shape distributions and help in deciding on the appropriate transformation type. Since our
data distributions has shown considerable level of left-side skewness, the decision to transform
the variables was taken, and Logarithmic and Square Root transformations were used, based
on Touray (2004) with reference to McLeay and Omar (1999). This finding is supported also by
Gujarati (1995). After the transformation, we computed the two normality test again and
plotted the graphs as appear in Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source
not found. As can be seen the shape of histogram (Error!
Error! Reference source not found.
found.) for the
transformed variables has improved remarkably to appropriate the normal distributions for all
the variables.

- Collinearity and Homoscedasticity
Using Pearson Correlation matrix for the raw and transformed data separately show in
Table V.2 and Table V.3. No high significant correlation among variables both raw and transformed
data. Gujarati (2003) mentioned in his book if the correlation that high correlation between
variables is above 0.8.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol12/iss1/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v12i1

110

Ascarya: LESSONS LEARNED FROM REPEATED FINANCIAL CRISES: AN ISLAMIC ECONOM
Determinant of Sukuk Ratings

107

Table V.2
Pearson Correlation matrix
ASET
ASET

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
BETA
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
INTCOV
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
RATGUAR1 Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
ROA
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
LTLEV
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

1
.674
38
-.070
.674
38
-.120
.486
36
-.129
.441
38
-.137
.413
38
-.083
.620
38

BETA

INTCOV

-.070
.486
38
1
39
-.240
.159
36
-.050
.761
39
-.403*
.012
38
.404*
.012
38

RATGUAR1

-.120
.441
36
-.240
.159
36
1
36
.132
.442
36
.425**
.010
36
-.485**
.003
36

-.129
.413
38
-.050
.761
39
.132
.442
36
1
39
.217
.191
38
.159
.339
38

ROA
-.137
.620
38
-.403*
.012
38
.425**
.010
36
.217
.191
38
1
38
-.311
.057
38

LTLEV
-.083
38
.404*
.012
38
-.485**
.003
36
.159
.339
38
-.311
.057
38
1
38

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table V.3
Pearson Correlation matrix
LNASSET
LNASSET

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
LNROA
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
SQBETA
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
LNCOV
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
SQLEV
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
LNREC
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
RATGUAR1 Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

1
38
-.440*
.012
32
.200
.229
38
-.102
.573
33
-.018
.915
38
.571**
.000
38
-.170
.308
38

LNROA

SQBETA

LNCOV

SQLEV

LNREC

RATGUAR1

-.440*
.012
32
1

.200
.229
38
-.334
.061
32
1

-.102
.573
33
.451*
.012
30
-.452**
.008
33
1

-.018
.915
38
-.149
.414
32
.354*
.025
40
-.654**
.000
33
1

.571**
.000
38
-.152
.405
32
.158
.342
38
.061
.735
33
-.104
.534
38
1

-.170
.308
38
.438*
.012
32
-.095
.561
40
.116
.520
33
.026
.873
40
.068
.685
38
1

32
-.334
.061
32
.451*
.012
30
-.149
.414
32
-.152
.405
32
.438*
.012
32

40
-.452**
.008
33
.354*
.025
40
.158
.342
38
-.095
.561
40

33
-.654**
.000
33
.061
.735
33
.116
.520
33

40
-.104
.534
38
.026
.873
40

38
.068
.685
38

40

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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V.2. Assessing the Multinomial Logistic Regression Result (significance tests)
V.2.1. Interpretation of Result (Parameter Estimates)
The result in the parameter estimates is extracted here as shown below:
Equation 1 Predicted logit (AA/A), AA contrasted to A
= 4.76 + (1.877)*lnasset + (-13.9)*sqbeta + (-4.96)*ratguar*D
Equation 2 Predicted logit (AAA/A), AAA contrasted to A
= 12.5 + (4.877)*lnasset + (-49.7)*sqbeta + (-29.3)*ratguar*D
According to the signs of coefficients of the M-Logit model here, the log of the odds of
getting AAA or AA compared to getting A rating is positively related to total asset and negatively
related to beta and bond guarantee status. Only three variables are selected as significant
variable in determining bond rating. The negative coefficient associated with dummy independent
variable (guarantee status) suggest that, holding all other variables constant, sukuk without
guarantee are less likely to get an AAA rating as compared to get A rating. The positive coefficient
tells the opposite. The above statistical significance findings are not to be taken seriously because
Wald statistic is said to be inaccurate sometimes especially when coefficients are larger as seen
in Table V.4. Our final conclusion is base on the model as well as individual independent
significance test using Likelihood Ratio.
Table V.4
Parameter Estimates

RATINGa

2.00

3.00

B

Std. Error

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

95% Confidence Interval
for Exp(B)
Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

Intercept
SQBETA
LNASSET
[RATGUAR1=.00]
[RATGUAR1=1.00]

4.759
-13.918
1.877
-4.963
0b

4.781
6.738
1.086
2.695
-

.991
4.267
2.988
3.391
-

1
1
1
1
0

.320
.039
.084
.066
-

9.02E-007
6.537
.007
-

1.66E-012
.778
3.55E-005
-

Intercept
SQBETA
LNASSET
[RATGUAR1=.00]
[RATGUAR1=1.00]

12.516
-49.683
4.877
-29.304
0b

12.435
47.004
5.863
.000
-

1.013
1.117
.692
-

1
1
1
1
0

.314
.291
.406
-

2.65E-022
131.194
1.88E-013
-

2.59E-062 2.709E+018
.001 12848646.39
1.88E-013
1.88E-013
-

.490
54.950
1.377
-

a. The reference category is: 1.00.
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
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V.2.2. Testing overall fit
The 2-log-likelihood value shown below is examined to determine the improvement of
the final M-Logit model over the intercept term only and thus it is an overall model test. As can
be seen from the table below, the difference between the value of Chi-Square in Table V.5
column 3 is 42.269 with 6 degrees of freedom is highly significant (p<0.000). Therefore, since
the observed significance level is very small, we can reject the null hypothesis that the effects of
all coefficients in the model are zero and hence conclude that our final model is significantly
better than the intercept only model.
Table V.5
2 Log Likelihood
Model

Model Fitting
Criteria
-2 Log Likelihood

Intercept Only
Final

61.742
19.473

Likelihood Ratio Tests
Chi-Square

df

42.269

Sig.

6

.000

V.2.3. Testing the significance of Individual coefficients.
The Likelihood Ratio test shown in table below presents the test result for the effect
of individual independent variables in the final model. The -2-Log-Likelihood is highly
significant with (p<0,000) for beta, (p<0.001) for rating guarantor and (p<0.006) for total
asset. As mentioned earlier, Norusis (1999) indicated that the Likelihood Test method not
only provides an overall significant test for the model, but also it provides the most accurate
and reliable test for the effect of individual independent variables in the model. As shown in
Table V.6.
Table V.6
Likelihood Ratio Test
Model Fitting
Criteria
Effect

Intercept
LNASSET
SQBETA
RATGUAR1

-2 Log Likelihood
of Reduced Model
19.473(a)
29.629
43.066
34.652

Likelihood Ratio Tests
Chi-Square
.000
10.156
23.593
15.179
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The Pseudo-R2 test shows the measurement from Cox and Snell, Negelkerke and
McFadden»s Pseudo-R2. As seen in the table McFadden»s R2 is about 67%, Negelkerke R2 is
about 86.1% and Cox and Snell is about 75.6%. Thus, we can say that our model has explained
on average more than half of the variations observed in the dependent variables based on
Pseudo-R2.

V.2.4. M-Logit Model Classification Result
Table V.7 presents the prediction results of the estimated M-Logit coefficients in the
previous section. The columns are the predicted values and the rows are the actual values. The
result shows 80% (24/30) of all valid cases are correctly classified into their original rating
classes. The highest correct classification rate is in AAA rating category in which 83.3% (5/6) of
all cases in that group being correctly classified. Next to that is the A rating category with
81.8% (9/11) of all cases in that group being correctly classified. The lowest hit rate is AA rating
category, with few different from other categories 76.9% (10/13) of all cases in that group
being correctly classified.
Table V.7
Model Classification Result
Predicted
Observed

1.00
2.00
3.00
Overall Percentage

1.00
9
3
0
40.0%

2.00
2
10
1
43.3%

3.00
0
0
5
16.7%

Percent
Correct
81.8%
76.9%
83.3%
80.0%

VI. CONCLUSION
To sum up the results of the M-Logit model in this section, we can say that from a set of
six independent variables (total asset, long-term leverage, interest coverage, roa, beta and
guarantee status) only three variables (total asset, beta and guarantee status) were found to
have significant explanatory relationship with sukuk ratings. This particular combination of the
above listed variables was also found to be superior to all other combinations in terms of
classification rate, model significance level as well as the individual variables significance.
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The result shows 80% (24/30) of all valid cases are correctly classified into their original
rating classes. However, the poor performance of other variables to predict the current ratings
is not surprising at all. We have actually observed these phenomena in our data, that is to say,
some of the ratings were downgraded or upgraded by the distribution cash flow performance
of its sukuk. Some of sukuk has negative outlook because of having problem in distributing the
regular payments to sukuk holders. This indicates this variable is important in determining
sukuk rating and lead us to approach special model that can captured these element.
This argument also mentioned in one of rating approach from rating agencies as mentioned
earlier in literature review. Sukuk ratings specifically assess the likelihood of full and timely
payment of obligations to holders of the instrument issued under the various debt-based Islamic
financing contract(s), which can be likened to the concept of probability of default in conventional
debt ratings. To overcome this condition further research are needed to combine another
significant variables in order to get robust result.
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